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Abstract  
The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between economic growth and the foreign 
policy of regional powers. It is a single case study of Turkey in the Middle East region. This 
thesis uses the regional level of analysis and explores different conceptualizations of regions in 
international relations. Mainly it focuses on the regional security complex theory formulated by 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. 
Hypothesis for the analysis is that economic growth experienced by regional powers enables 
them to spend more resources to increase their capability of power projection. Increased amount 
of resources together with the desire to strive for regional hegemony, pushes regional powers to 
adopt a more active and asserting foreign policy in their own region.  
The conducted analysis about Turkey reveals that economic growth correlates strongly to the 
amount of available resources Turkey has for conducting foreign policy. To analyze Turkish 
foreign political engagement and activity in the region, press releases from the Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs were used. The analyze based on them indicated that during the years 
following a fast economic growth Turkish officials undertake more trips to countries in the 
Middle East and the number of mentioning of Middle East countries in press releases increase. 
That indicates that economic growth correlates positively with regional foreign political activity. 
Qualitative analysis of the press releases reveals that Turkey has adopted a more assertive and 
critical foreign policy towards Iraq, Syria and Egypt compared to 10 years ago. Therefore, the 
hypothesis of this thesis is considered to be true. 
Keywords: regional power, economic growth, foreign political activity, Turkey, Middle East 
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Introduction 
The dream of most people involved in the field of international relations is to find explanations 
for the behavior of states. Because of that there are a countless number of writings dedicated to 
finding that out and this thesis is one of those many works. Exploring the theoretical behavior of 
states is fascinating because it gives us a clue to predict the future actions undertaken by 
countries in the world. That gives this field of research a practical value. As the world around us 
is complex, it is never possible to find a grand theory that perfectly explains the behavior of all 
states in all cases. Therefore, there is always work to be done at analyzing the behavior of 
different groups of states in various foreign political situations. 
The aim of this specific thesis is to explore the behavior of regional powers in the developing 
world. To do that, the case study of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa region is used. 
Distinct features of regional powers in the developing world include the fact that they have more 
power projection capabilities than other states in the region and that they are still experiencing a 
rapid economic growth. This thesis posits that the foreign policy of such states is affected by 
their economic growth and that makes them behave in a specific manner. The underlying logic 
here is that those states will have more resources to spend for their foreign policy as their 
economy develops. The increase of resources together with the general shift in regional balance 
of power and the neorealist principle of states trying to maximize their own power pushes 
developing regional powers to adopt a more active and assertive foreign policy in their own 
region. In the long term such states should attempt to achieve regional hegemony. 
Theory wise this thesis subscribes to the opinion that regional level of analysis is important in 
international relations. That means most states don’t interact with each other on the global level, 
but regional. To define regions and the behavior of states inside of them, this thesis primarily 
relies on the regional security complexes theory created by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever which 
says that states are bound to specific regions based on common threats and interactions. In 
addition to that, it is assumed that inside of regions most of the foreign principles of global level 
of analysis apply. Most notably, the neorealist principle of states trying to maximize their own 
power to increase their own safety and wellbeing is considered to apply in regions as well. With 
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a few exceptions, international relations in regions can be observed like a miniature version of 
international relations on the global level.
1
 
The research done in this thesis has some limitations like always. This thesis uses the example of 
Turkey in the Middle East as the basis of analysis. The world around us is not uniform and 
therefore there are various different types of regions and regional powers. Some of the regions of 
the world are multipolar like the Middle East and others are not. Some regions include states that 
are world superpowers, some are more focused on hostile interactions than others. Regions differ 
and therefore, it is impossible to make sweeping conclusions about the behavior of every single 
regional power based on the analysis of Turkey. The findings of this thesis apply better for 
regions and states that are similar to the Turkey and the Middle East than to the ones that are 
completely different. In addition to that, this thesis mainly uses the principles of neorealism. That 
does not mean other theoretical approaches would automatically be invalid and couldn’t explain 
the world equally as good. 
The topic of this study is significant, because it enables to explore the behavior of regional 
powers in the developing world. In general the IR literature and analysis is focuses on 
developing world countries and the global level of analysis. Therefore, this thesis deals with an 
area that is still relatively underexplored. In addition to that it is possible to see the impact 
developing regional powers have on the affairs of the world from simply turning on the 
television. Turkey and the Middle East in particular are involved in many present day crises and 
are especially worth analyzing.  
This thesis consists of 3 different parts. In first of them, theoretical background about the 
covered topics is presented. That part is mainly about the theoretical ideas regarding regions and 
different types of existing regional orders. While a literature overview is presented, this thesis 
mainly relies on the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. In addition to dealing with regions, 
a brief overview about neorealist theory and how states act according to it is presented. At the 
end of the theoretical part a hypothesis for analysis is phrased. 
                                                          
1
 Most importantly, global level superpowers have the possibility to intervene into regional matters and adopt the 
role of balancers 
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Second part of this writing deals with methodology. An overview of advantages and 
disadvantages of using a single case study is given. The Middle East region is defined and 
conceptualized based on theories and case selection of that region and Turkey as a regional 
power is justified. Final section of methodology deals with conceptualizing and operationalizing 
the hypothesis laid out in the theoretical part. 
The largest section of the thesis is devoted for the actual analysis of Turkey in the Middle East. 
First of all Turkish standing relative to other states in the region is found out. Then the question 
about by how much the material resources of Turkey have increased in the recent years is looked 
into. Finally Turkish foreign political activity in the region is analyzed by using the press 
releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web page and connection between 
foreign political activity and economic growth is found. 
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Theory 
Regional level of analysis 
It is possible to distinguish different levels of analysis when studying international relations. In 
1959 Kenneth Waltz identified 3 of them in his book “Man, the State and War”. Those were the 
individual, the state and the system levels.  Out of those 3, the system level analysis has become 
the most common as that has been favored by the dominant neorealist school of thought that 
largely ignored the other levels. (Soltani, Naji, & Ekhtiari, 2014, p. 167) In the recent decades, 
the spectrum of approaches to studying international relations has broadened and there have been 
various claims that the system level analysis may not be the best for explaining what is truly 
happening in the world and new levels of analysis have appeared.  
The 2003 publication Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s “Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security” has bought a lot of attention to the regional level of analysis and has 
made it part of mainstream international relations studies. The recent spark of interest in regional 
analysis has a lot to do with the end of Cold War. During that time period world was described as 
a bipolar system with two competing superpowers. Struggle between USA and Soviet Union was 
seen as the defining element of international system and the role of smaller states was primarily 
to ally one of the two primary actors. As the conflict between the superpowers was intense and 
they had the ability to project their power across the globe, regional disputes between smaller 
states became strongly polarized and had a high level of involvement by USA and Soviet Union. 
Therefore, regional conflicts were often not seen as something distinct, but rather as a part of 
global clash between the superpowers.   
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, situation in global politics shifted 
dramatically. Gone was the period where intense global rivalry shaped the world and instead of 
bipolarity, a unipolar USA dominated and system developed
2
. Together with the disappearance 
of the global conflict, regional theories of international relations gained traction. (Mehmetcik, 
2015, p. 137)  
During the post-Cold War era there, has been less interference into regional matters by global 
actors. Russia as the successor state of Soviet Union was considerably weakened and was simply 
                                                          
2
 Although there are various claims that by nowadays a multipolar system has emerged or is presently emerging 
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unable to support its’ allies in faraway places.  USA on the other hand had won the global 
conflict and therefore, did not have to assert its’ influence as strongly as before because for a 
while there was no competitor for their hegemonic role in the world. That meant the intense 
polarization of the world ended and weaker states of the world started to have other options than 
to align their foreign policy according to the demands of one or the other of the global powers.  
The decrease of interest of global powers to what is happening in different regions of the world 
has opened a door for regional actors. Essentially, the end of Cold War brought with it a power 
vacuum in various places across the globe where it is increasingly possible for local states to 
assert influence in their nearby area without facing strong opposition from global actors. (Buzan, 
1991, pp. 434-435) Before the 90s, regional actors’ ambitions could have been easily overridden 
by the desires of their global allies or be put aside out of fear of intervention by the opposing 
superpower. At the present day both of those are less likely to happen and regional powers have 
reached a new level of independence in their foreign policy. (Buzan & Wæver, Regions and 
Powers, 2003, pp. 10-11) Therefore, the regional actors have overtaken global actors in being the 
most important players in shaping the pattern of international relations in much of the world and 
it is worth to pay more attention to why and how they act. As the global level of analysis of 
international relations mostly ignores regional powers, it has lost a big part of its’ analytical 
power and opened up a place for various regional theories to emerge. 
Regionalist approach has many advantages over global systematic level theories. Robert E. 
Kelley has brought out 5 major claims that advocates of regionalism are often bringing out for 
its’ usage. (Kelly, 2007, pp. 199-200) 
First of all, geography places practical limitations upon the behavior of states. Most forms of 
threat are not global in nature and can travel only a relatively short distance. Because of that 
states are more concerned about what is happening close to them than at the other side of the 
globe. Furthermore, a large majority of states in the world have very limited capabilities to 
project their power across large distances and therefore can really not fully participate in global 
matters. Those states are ignored by global level of analysis even though they may be relevant 
actors on a regional level. 
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Secondly, when systematic theories acknowledge the existence of regional actors, they do it from 
a one-sided perspective. It is usually assumed that a global power exerts a strong level of 
influence on regional actors, but not vice a versa. That is often not the case in reality, 
exemplified by the fact that even though USA is a global power with strong interests in the 
Middle East region, their policy is strongly influenced by Israel – one of the regional actors. 
Therefore, the role of regional actors can’t be diminished into just obeying the orders of global 
powers. 
Thirdly, regional analysis has a normative side. It enforces the view point that smaller states of 
the international system are also valuable and deserve their existence. By rejecting the sole focus 
of global powers, it condemns the idea of (neo)imperialism. 
Fourthly, it has become noticeable more difficult for the global powers to project their power 
around the world. While regional analysis still assumes that global level actors can meddle with 
the regional level and influence what is happening there, interventions by great power have 
become increasingly ineffective.  Although USA for example has the strongest army in the world 
and should have an upper hand in any conflict they face, it has largely failed to carry out 
successful foreign policy in different corners of the world. The Iraq invasion by USA did not 
bring the desired long term results and the events unfolding in the Middle East seem to be out of 
USA’s control. 
Lastly, while most regionalist scholars accept the existence of grand theories of international 
relations, they reject the notion of those theories applying strictly uniformly everywhere in the 
world. Often global theories simply fail to accurately describe what is happening in parts of the 
world. When a grand theory and reality markedly differ from each other, regionalists usually 
prefer to adapt the grand theory or opt for using a deductive approach to the local situation and 
make new theoretical generalizations. 
Regions in international relations 
When speaking about regions in international relations, there is a need to define what exactly 
constitutes a region. There is no universally accepted answer to that problem and various authors 
conceptualize the term differently. It is generally agreed on that regions in the sense of 
international relations are not exclusively defied by geography. 
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William Thompson has bought out 4 other principles that most international relations scholars 
use to define regions. (Thompson, 1973, pp. 98-101) First of all, regions must have some sort of 
intense and regular interaction between the states that are in the region. Secondly, regions do 
have some geographical basis – they are formed by states located close to each other, but are not 
necessarily defined by common geographical features. Thirdly, actors of a region should 
themselves recognize the existence of the region as a distinct area. Lastly, regions can’t 
encompass only one state. For there to be interaction, a minimum of 2 different actors should be 
included in a region. Notably, these principles leave a lot up for interpretation and do not 
determinate how to exactly split the world into different regions. To determinate concrete regions 
of the world, one needs to find answers to questions like how strong an interaction do states need 
to have between themselves to be grouped into one region, what types of interaction are relevant 
and how to measure them. 
Arguably the most influential IR approach to regions is the regional security complex theory of 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. According to them world is divided into 9 distinct regions that are 
bound together by common security interactions. As most security threats can travel only a 
limited distance, countries are generally not overtly concerned about threats stemming outside of 
their own region. They depict regions as territorially compact forms of anarchic communities 
where states compete with each other and have complex patterns of enmity and amity. Feelings 
of hostility and friendship are largely dependent on the historical relations, different ideologies, 
religions and ethnic groups and political systems of the countries. Due to that alliances inside a 
region are not solely based on power calculations. In general Buzan and Wæver think that most 
neorealist system level theories can be adapted and downscaled to the regional level. Therefore, 
principles like balance of power apply to regions as well. The theory of regional security 
complexes assumes that no state can be part of more than one region and even though global 
powers sometimes intervene in distant places, they are seen as out of region actors who do not 
shape the polarity of specific regions. (Buzan & Wæver, Regions and Powers, 2003) According 
to them a region can be found by drawing arrows of security concerns on a map and seeing based 
on that how groups of countries are linked together. (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 45) 
Douglas Lemke shares some of the ideas of Buzan and Wæver, but bases his approach of regions 
on downscaling power transition theory. Similarly to them, he believes that security interactions 
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are more intense between geographically nearby states and that security is basis for defining 
regions. Unlike them, he does not emphasize strongly on long lasting patterns of enmity and 
amity between counties in the same region. He instead focuses mainly on the common sources of 
threat and power of states. Theoretically his approach to delimiting regions is looking at the 
power projection capabilities of countries. If a state loses more than half of its’ power projection 
ability across the distance required to reach another state’s capital, the two states are considered 
to be in different regions. (Kelly, 2007, pp. 211-212) That means similarly to Buzan and 
Wæver’s regions, his regions are geographically compact. According to Lemke’s criteria of 
power projection, 23 different regional systems or hierarchies as he calls them exist. (Lemke, 
2002, p. 49) In each of those hierarchies states are supposed to function in a similar way as in the 
global hierarchy of states. The main difference being that one state can be a great power in its’ 
regional hierarchy while being a fairly insignificant power in the global hierarchy. 
David A. Lake takes a rather different approach to regions. He rejects the notion that regions 
have to be geographically compact or that history matters in formation of regions. According to 
him regions are solely the creations of specific sources of threats. All states that share the same 
source of threat are included to be in one region. The word region itself simply indicates an area 
that spans anything less than the whole world. Therefore, countries that are geographically 
distant to each other can form common security regions – for example USA can belong to the 
same security region with Middle Eastern countries based on common threat of ISIS. As Lake’s 
regions are centered on specific security threats, one state can belong to more than 1 region at a 
time and there is no definite number of regions in the world. (Lake, 1997, pp. 49-51) 
Like other areas of international relations, regional analysis is opened to critical theories. Many 
of the critical scholars do not think that global theories of international relations can be easily 
adapted to regional level and support deductive approaches in creating new regional theories. 
Third World scholars for example has brought out the fact that many regions of the world consist 
of rather weak and undeveloped states that have completely different security realities compared 
to developed countries. For the developing world countries existential security threats are often 
not external like potential attacks from neighboring states, but internal like secessionist and 
irredentist movements or terroristic acts. These internal issues are supposedly worrying enough 
for weak states that they do not have much capability to fight between each other. According to 
13 
 
this type of critical theory, regions are not bound together by external security threats, but rather 
by elites of states with similar internal threats forming alliances to maintain their domestic order. 
Therefore, regions like Southeast Asia are formed by the cooperation of unstable autocratic 
regimes that try to bolster the sovereignty of individual states in the area.  (Kelly, 2007, pp. 212-
215) 
Perhaps the most extreme approach to regions has been brought out by Peter J. Katzenstein. 
According to him, regions are not autonomous areas formed by regional actors, but are rather 
created by the global hegemon as a tool to spread its’ power. He believes that USA as the current 
global hegemon has split world into 6 different regions based on self-interest. In important 
regions USA relies on node states like Germany in Europe or Japan in Asia that are allied to 
them and coordinate regional development that benefits USA. The usage of local actors is 
supposed to mask the direct intrusion by the superpower and make the projection of power more 
acceptable to smaller states. Therefore, Katzenstein believes that regions do not function 
independently and analyzing them without strongly considering the influence of the global 
hegemon is not meaningful. (Katzestein, 2005, pp. 37-43).  
The brief review of region theories of international relations reveals that there are many different 
ways how to conceptualize regions that are often mutually exclusive. Therefore, a choice has to 
be made about which exact approach to use to study regions. Out of the previously described 
ideas of how to conceptualize regions, the author of this thesis agrees mostly with Buzan and 
Wæver’s. That is because for regions to be something meaningful, they should correspond as 
much as possible to intuitive perception to regions. Therefore, approaches where regions are 
depicted to have no geographic or cultural/historical basis (Lake’s approach) are not preferable. 
Neither are critical theories used to conceptualize regions as they often assume that regions are 
either not a meaningful level of analysis or they rely overly on deductive theories. Buzan and 
Wæver have the most holistic way of depicting regions while splitting the world into seemingly 
appropriate sized parts. 
Regional order 
Not all regions of the world are similar to each other and there are various ways how to describe 
different regions. According to Buzan and Wæver regions come in two main types– centered and 
standard. A centered region is one where a great power is present. That means one of the states in 
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the region has clearly superior capabilities compared to others and dominates the region. In those 
kind of regions the interactions between states is strongly linked to the global power.  Centered 
regions tend to be relatively stable as no other country has a meaningful chance to challenge 
global power. The region itself is essentially turned into the “backyard” of the global power and 
the states instead of it do not have a lot of autonomy. It is also rather difficult for great powers to 
intervene in a region that is centered on another great power. 
Standard regions are the ones that do not have any global powers located in them. Due to that 
there is usually no single state that can control the region and countries inside such regions have 
generally more chances to conduct independent foreign policy than states in a centered region. 
The nature of standard regions is largely shaped by the individual actors inside them who often 
rely on outside global powers to help them against their regional adversaries. Therefore, standard 
regions are anarchic and rather prone to conflicts. 
It is possible to separate three different types of standard regions: uni-, bi- and multipolar ones. 
In unipolar regions there is one state that is a lot more powerful than the others. Unlike in 
centered regions that country is not a global power and therefor outside global powers have the 
possibility to intervene in the region. Two regional powers form a bipolar region. Those regions 
are a lot like downscaled versions of the world during the Cold War era and are prone to forming 
opposing regional alliances. Having more than 2 roughly equally powerful states present in a 
region creates a multipolar region. They are similar to Westphalian world and are the most 
conflict prone and anarchic out of all regions. Inside them complex patterns of alliances that 
often shift can develop. (Buzan & Wæver, Regions and Powers, 2003, pp. 52-59)  
As according to Buzan and Wæver regions are shaped by the regional powers inside them, it is 
neccesary to conceptualize them. Their definition of regional powers is rather basic – a regional 
power is simply a state that defines the polarity of their region, but is not powerful enough to be 
a great power nor is seen to be influential on the global scale. (Buzan & Wæver, Regions and 
Powers, 2003, p. 37) 
Detlef Nolte has analyzed various approaches to regional powers and lays out a clearer definition 
of them. First of all, a regional power needs to have self-conception of being one. That means the 
state must have the actual desire to take the leadership role. Secondly, the state needs to possess 
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enough resources. Those are for example military equipment, money and population. Lastly, a 
regional state must be able to have real impact on regional matters. Therefore, states that seem to 
be strong on the thesis, but never manage to succeed in their regional goals can’t be thought 
about as a regional power. (Nolte, 2010, p. 893) 
Structural realism and behavior of states 
As already mentioned before, Buzan and Waever believe that broadly speaking, it is possible to 
downscale global level theories to regional level of analysis. The current thesis uses the 
neorealist idea that all states try to maximize their power and expands on it in explaining why 
that pushes developing regional powers to attempt achieving regional hegemonic status. 
According to the realist school of thought, all states want power. Earlier writers of classical 
realism like Hans Morgenthau explained that search of power with human nature. They simply 
believed that every single human being has a desire for power that carries over to the behavior of 
states. Newer structural realist theories on the other hand claim that states seek to increase their 
power due to the nature of the international system. According to them, the anarchic nature of the 
world means that states have no higher institution or power to help them in the times of need. 
Therefore, countries can only rely on themselves and it is easier to defend itself when one has 
more power. (Mearsheimer, 2013, p. 72) 
The main point of disagreement among the structural realists is the question about how much 
power should a country seek. Offensive realists, like Mearsheimer for example, believe that a 
state can never have enough power and therefore all countries should always seek ways how to 
maximize their power. Defensive realists like Waltz on the other hand claim that there is a 
certain threshold above what a country should not attempt to increase its’ power. Surpassing that, 
opposing balancing blocks against the state are ought to appear and the security of the country 
worsens. (Slaughter, 2011, pp. 4-5) 
Out of the two structural realism schools, offensive realism seems more appropriate for regional 
analysis. Defensive realism assumes that balancing blocks form against a potential hegemon, 
because that is the only way how that country could be stopped from dominating the world. On 
regional level, things are a little bit different. If a country would become a regional hegemon, it 
would become a global level actor, but would still have opposition from other global powers. 
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Therefore, their power would not be unchecked and they could not assert total dominance. While 
that does not mean there is no balancing against countries that try to achieve regional hegemony, 
it does mean that it occurs in a lesser extent than balancing on the global level. Countries that 
have achieved hegemony (for example USA and Russia) in their own region demonstrate that 
often times balancing does not happen and nearby states opt for bandwagoning behavior instead. 
Because of that, offensive realism seems to be better at explaining how regions act than 
defensive realism. 
States do not attempt to project their power equally all over the world. Rather they try to focus 
on their own region. Mearsheimer has stated for example that while global hegemony would be 
ideal for a state, it is in fact an unattainable goal. The main reason for that is the difficulty of 
projecting one’s power over geographical obstacles. Regional hegemony on the other hand is 
something that is possible to achieve and therefore, states have the principal goal of achieving 
that status. He goes as far to saying that all states are revisionist until they achieve regional 
hegemony and at that point they become status quo powers. (Snyder, 2002, p. 159) 
Although according to this theory, all states of the world try to increase their level of influence 
and should therefore take up an active and rather offensive foreign policy, in reality that doesn’t 
always happen. To assert dominance over nearby states, one needs to have enough resources for 
it. Without sufficient resources, all sorts of attempts at increasing a states’ influence or trying to 
achieve hegemony are futile and states as rational actors ought to take a more passive and 
defensive foreign policy. Therefore, the amount of resources as state has and their foreign policy 
activeness are closely related.  
 
Mearsheimer has brought out 2 different types of resources a state possesses that are relevant for 
their search of hegemony – economic and military resources3. Economic power shows the wealth 
of a country has and includes both the size of the economy and size of population. Notably, 
population size is important because it directly affects the amount of things a state is able to 
produce. Military resources on the other hand are related to the amount of weapons, machines, 
military personal and technology a country has. Military and economic resources are related in 
                                                          
3
 He calls economic resources latent power and military resources military power. The current thesis opts to use 
the word resources to avoid confusion between terms power as resources (for example military power) and power 
as a state (for example regional power). 
17 
 
the way that a state can shift their economic resources into military ones. Essentially that means 
that to buy modern military equipment, a state needs sufficient amount of money. Those 2 types 
of resources combined determinate the capability of a country to gain international power and 
influence. (Mearsheimer, 2013, pp. 72-73)  
 
The author of this thesis believes that by extending the logic of structural realism, it is possible to 
say that the foreign policy of developing regional powers should become more active and 
aggressive in time and that they are the states that in practice pursue hegemony the most. By 
definition regional powers are states that have a relatively large amount of resources compared to 
the other countries in their region. That means they already have some capacity to dominate over 
nearby states. (Flemes, 2007, p. 11) As the developing world regional powers are experiencing 
rapid economic growth, the resources they have to spend on achieving foreign policy goals only 
increase in time. By the logic of structural realism, as the capabilities of those states continue to 
grow, they should start asserting more influence in their region and their foreign policy should 
become more active and dominating. In the long term that should result in regional powers vying 
for the status of regional hegemon.  
 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that economic growth allows regional powers to increase 
their material power projection capabilities and that creates a situation where the regional powers 
become increasingly active and assertive in their foreign policy. To confirm the hypothesis a 
connection between economic growth and foreign political activity is looked for. The case study 
used for analyzing is Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa region. 
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Methodology 
Single case study 
The research design of the current thesis uses a single case study. Compared to the other possible 
choices of conducting a large N statistical research or a small N comparative analysis, a case 
study has both strengths and weaknesses. While large N research excels and making 
generalizations that are applicable to a large amount of cases, a single case analysis allows 
observing a single occurrence of a phenomenon closely and make more nuanced claims about it.  
 
The main point of a case study is not to solely analyze a specific selected case. Instead of that a 
case study analyses a larger phenomenon by simply selecting one single well defined case to 
exemplify it. (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 18)Therefore, the current thesis is not mainly about 
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, but rather about developing regional powers’ foreign 
policy in their respective regions and Turkey is just a case used to exemplify that behavior of that 
group of countries. 
 
According to Bennet and George there are 4 main advantages of a case study. They are a large 
degree of conceptual validity, the possibility to derive new hypothesis, exploration of causal 
mechanics and modeling complex cases. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 19-22) 
 
Case studies can assure a high level of conceptual validity. As there is only one case to observe, 
a researcher can choose concepts and indicators to fit their chosen theory as well as possible. 
Therefore, it can largely ignore the problem of travelling concepts where the meaning of 
something is different in various cases based on the cultural background. For example, concepts 
like democracy are rather context dependent and democratic governments in USA, Rwanda and 
Russia would different a lot from each other. As a single case study does not have to lump 
together cases that have a large variation, it is protected from conceptual stretching. 
 
Secondly, case studies are valuable for developing new theories. Often times a researcher posits 
a hypothesis about a phenomenon, but finds that to be false. While large N statistical analysis 
may prove or disprove a hypothesis, it does not have the ability to really spot causal links that 
were not specifically looked for. In a case study however, it is possible to spot things that were 
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not explicitly looked for and generalize new theories based on those findings. Therefore, a case 
study allows to find potential new hypotheses which may latter be further tested by different 
research designs. 
 
Thirdly, a case study is better at explaining the exact causal mechanics of a case than a purely 
statistical analysis is. While a statistical analysis may find correlation between different 
phenomena occurring, it is not the same as giving a causal explanation. A case study can closely 
examine contextual factors and therefor identify the exact causality together with finding out 
potential intervening variables which a statistical study could not discover. 
 
Lastly, a case study is better for modeling complex phenomena. For example that approach 
allows accommodating for equifinality, complex interaction effects and path dependency. The 
more complex a relationship between 2 phenomena is the more difficult it is to study it with 
statistical analysis as the number of statistical calculations rises exponentially and the findings 
become harder to interpret. Case studies on the other hand allow keeping things simple and bring 
more clarity to complex interactions. 
 
Single case studies have trade-offs compared to statistical analysis as well. They are mainly 
about lack of representativeness, inability to measure the strength of variables and the bias of 
case selection. 
As case studies are based on a single case, it is often impossible to claim that everything found in 
such type of research applies in all similar cases. The main premise of a case study is that cases 
do differ from each other in many ways and that context matters. A case study usually sacrifices 
generalization for explanatory richness. Therefore, findings of a those study can’t be 
automatically generalized to apply in a larger group. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 30-32) To 
find out if the discoveries made in a case study are truly representative, a statistical large N study 
should follow it. 
While case studies are good at identifying causal relationship between different phenomena, it is 
not very useful for assessing the strength of them. A case study is useful for finding new 
variables to explain complex cases, but often fails to find out which of the variables is the most 
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important. When statistical studies can run correlations and bring out numerical values to assess 
the relative importance of different variables, a case study often has no objective way in 
measuring the strength of causality. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 25-27) 
Finally, a case study is particularly prone to selection bias. As in single case studies, the 
researcher has only picked one study case, it may happen that this particular case is simply not 
representative of the phenomena being researched at all. Furthermore, a case may be selected 
with the intention to get some specific desired result and that may lead the researcher in only 
looking at the factors which he already believes to be true. The problem of case selection bias is 
partially mitigated by the fact that case studies do not claim to be highly representative of a large 
number of cases and acknowledges its’ limited explanatory power. (George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 
22-25) 
The current thesis has chosen to use a case study analysis because the matter of developing world 
regional powers foreign policy behavior is difficult to analyze in a large N study. Firstly, the 
amount of such states in the world is rather low and therefore, there may be insufficient amount 
of cases for a proper large N statistical research. Secondly, various regions of the world are 
rather different from each other and therefor the behavior of states inside of them is highly 
context dependent. A single case study can accommodate for the context dependence a lot better 
than a larger statistical study. 
The author of this thesis considered conducting a small N comparative analysis between different 
regional powers. That idea was mainly rejected due to the fact that such work falls outside of the 
scope of the master's thesis as it would require a lot more time and resources than currently 
available. A comparative analysis could be something to consider conducting in the future. 
Middle East as a region 
For the purpose of the thesis, Middle East is defined close to how Buzan and Wæver their 
Middle East Security Complex. According to their approach, it is a region that contains 3 smaller 
subregion inside of it. Those are the Maghreb formed by Morocco, Algeria, Tunesia and Libya; 
the Levant formed by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; and finally the Gulf formed by 
Bahrain,  Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
Notably, they do not include Turkey as part of the Middle East region, but rather opt to have it as 
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an insulator sate between Europe and Middle East that truly does not belong to either of them. 
(Buzan & Wæver, Regions and Powers, 2003, p. 189) The author of this thesis has a different 
opinion and includes Turkey in the Levant subregion of the Middle East. That is caused by the 
fact that the main Turkish security threats stem from the other actors in the Middle East, for 
example ISIS at the present day. 
When looking at the Middle East region and what unites it, one can easily notice the prevelance 
of different conflicts. The most important of them being the Arab-Israel conflict where all of the 
Middle Eastern states have been involved in one way or another. In the Gulf region Iran and Iraq 
and Saudi Arabi have all been at odds against each other and are participating in a long lasting 
power struggle. In Maghreb the most prevalant case of enmity has been the dispute between 
Morocco and Algeria about the territorial claims to Western Sahara. None of these cases have 
been strictly speaking conflicts between 2 states, but rather regional matters. (Buzan & Wæver, 
Regions and Powers, 2003, pp. 190-193). Recent events like the Syrian civil war or the wave of 
Arab revolutions have become new example of how security of Middle East states is connected. 
Many of the states there support one or another side in the Syrian civil war and states close to 
Syria have to deal with the influx of refugees escaping from the country while the Arab Spring 
events managed to overthrow governments from Tunesia to Yemen. 
To determinate the regional powers in the Middle East, it is easiest to look at the amount of 
material power different states have. For that a table with 5 different indicators is used here. 
Military expenditure and military personnel show the military capabilities of the state. Nominal 
GDP indicates how strong a country is economically while size of the population shows the long 
term demographic situation of a state and is required both for a strong economy and military. 
Finally, a national material capabilities indicator from Correlates of War dataset is included that 
sums up 6 different indicators and show how large share of world’s material (militaristic) 
capabilities a certain country posesses.
4
 
The following table below reveals that there are 4 states in the Middle East that share roughly an 
equal amount of capabilties. Those 4 states are Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. All of 
them have their strengths and weaknesses in different areas. Egypt has the largest population of 
                                                          
4
 Those 6 different indicators are total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy 
consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of a state (The Correlates of War Project, 2007) 
22 
 
the region and therefore, has a lot of long term potential to become more powerful. On the other 
hand their level of spending on military is rather low compared to the others. Iran has the largest 
military of the region, a sizable economy and population, but lacks in military expenditure as 
well. Saudi Arabia has around 40% of all military expenditure of the region and spends more 
than triple the money on military than any other state in the region. Compared to the other 
leading powers, their population is smaller and that may hamper them in the long term. Turkey 
has the largest economy and the third biggest population in the region. In addition to that they 
have a large number of military personnel and decent military funding. That makes Turkey 
probably the state in the region with the largest material capabilities which is also indicated by 
the Correlates of War dataset. They are closely followed by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt by that 
order. All other states of the region already have a far smaller material power base than those 4 
and therefore could not be considered to be regional powers. 
As bought out by Nolte, material capabilities do not solely determinate regional powers, but self-
identification of states and their influence on the region matter as well. It is likely that all 4 
already mentioned states have both the self-identification and the influence required to be 
regional powers. Analyzing that in detail falls outside the scope of this thesis and from now on it 
is considered that Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the regional powers of the Middle 
East. 
 
 
 
  
23 
 
 
Table 1 Material power resources of Middle Eastern countries 
Country 
Population 
in millions 
(World 
Bank, 
2014) 
Nominal 
GDP in 
billion 
USD 
(World 
Bank) 
Military 
expenditure 
in billion 
USD 
(Stockholm 
International 
Peace 
Research 
Institute, 
2014) 
Military 
personnel in 
thousands 
(Stockholm 
International 
Peace 
Research 
Institute, 
2014) 
National 
Material 
Capabilities 
% of world 
total (The 
Correlates 
of War 
Project, 
2007) 
Algeria 38.93 214.06 11.86 138 0.53% 
Bahrain 1.36 33.87 1.43 11 0.04% 
Egypt 89.58 286.54 4.96 469 0.97% 
Iran 78.14 415.34 12.72 545 1.35% 
Iraq 34.81 220.51 9.52 227 0.52% 
Israel 8.22 304.23 15.91 168 0.36% 
Jordan 6.61 35.83 1.27 101 0.14% 
Kuwait 3.75 175.83 5.82 16 0.13% 
Lebanon 4.55 45.73 2.12 72 0.08% 
Libya 6.26 41.12 3.30 76 0.18% 
Morocco 33.92 107.01 4.05 201 0.45% 
Oman 4.24 81.80 9.62 42 0.12% 
Qatar 2.17 211.82 1.88 12 0.09% 
Saudi Arabia 30.89 746.25 80.76 225 1.09% 
Syria 22.16 40.41 2.50 308 0.45% 
Tunisia 11.00 47.00 0.91 35 0.08% 
Turkey 75.93 799.54 22.62 515 1.43% 
United Arab 
Emirates 9.09 401.65 22.76 51 0.30% 
Yemen 26.18 35.96 1.72 67 0.16% 
Average 25.67 223.39 11.35 172.58 0.45% 
Total 487.79 4244.45 215.72 3279 8.47% 
 
Case selection 
Bent Flyvbjerg has bought out different reasons why a specific case can be selected to be the 
object of analysis of single case studies. Those include the case being an extreme, critical or 
paradigmatic example. According to him, extreme cases are the cases that stand out the most out 
of all cases by strongly exemplifying the researched phenomenon. While they may not be the 
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most representative, they vividly illustrate strong causal connections and are useful for getting 
ones’ point across and often give the most new information during analysis. Critical cases on the 
other hand are the cases which are the most or the least likely to confirm to a hypothesis. Those 
cases can confirm that a hypothesis should work in practically all instances or irrefutably falsify 
the chosen presumptions. The last strategy for choosing a case is picking the paradigmatic case. 
Those are the cases that are supposed to be the most significant examples of some phenomenon. 
A paradigmatic case should simply be determined to be a relevant example by both the scientific 
community and the population at large. Assessing what is significant and relevant is largely 
about intuition and therefor can’t be rationally explained, but those cases simply feel “right” to 
analyze. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 230-233) 
 
The current thesis has chosen the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and Northern Africa 
as a case to analyze as it is both an extreme and paradigmatic case of a regional developing 
power adopting a more active and aggressive line of foreign policy. The extreme nature of the 
case comes from the rather sudden change of Turkish foreign policy. For a long time the country 
followed Atatürk’s principle of non-intervention that was exemplified by the slogan “peace at 
home, peace in the world”. Largely due to that, Turkey refused to take part in military conflicts 
and notably even refused help for their NATO allies in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Since then the 
country has adopted new policies. They have started to take a lot more interest in regional 
matters and have been active for example in solving the Arab Spring crises and have participated 
in military actions on the territory of Syria and Iraq. 
Turkey and its’ foreign policy in the Middle East can also be considered a paradigmatic case.. 
Due to the turbulent actions constantly happening in that region, Middle East has for a long time 
been in the consciousness of the general population and heavily theorized about by the academia. 
Turkish foreign policy actions are relevant to what is happening in region and the world at large 
and intuitively feel like something that is important to research. Therefore, the selection of 
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East can be justified with both being an extreme and a 
paradigmatic case. 
Although the Middle East has several regional powers, Turkey has the best claims out of them 
for achieving regional hegemony. That stems from mainly 2 reasons. First of all Turkey has 
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strong historical connections to the whole region. The Ottoman state as predecessor for modern 
Turkey used to control most of the territory that is called the Middle East in the present day. That 
gives them a special status in regional affairs and has made it possible for Neo-Ottomanism to 
emerge (an ideology that supports active Turkish greater foreign political engagement across the 
former territory of the empire). (Onar, 2009, pp. 11-12) 
Due to those historical connections, Turkey has also developed interests in what is going on in 
Middle East in its’ entirety. While other states in the region do try to exert their influence, they 
are mainly interested in neighboring states. For example, Iran has a very active foreign policy in 
the Gulf subregion, but doesn’t really intervene much in Northern Africa. Turkey on the other 
hand attempts to gain the upper hand in the whole region and therefore has a broader scope of 
foreign policy. 
Secondly, as illustrated by the table 1, Turkey simply has the most material capabilities in the 
region. They have the highest GDP in Middle East which gives them the possibility to invest in 
capacity to project both hard and soft power. The large population size enables them to continue 
their quick economic growth in the future as well as get enough manpower for their army. A big 
strength of Turkey compared to the other states in the long term is that Turkish economy is rather 
developed and mainly relies on the production of goods and creation of services. Therefore, their 
economic model is sustainable in the long term.  
The main Turkish competitors in the region like Iran and Saudi Arabia are economies relying 
heavily on the export of natural resources (mainly oil and natural gas). The prices of these 
resources are first of all highly volatile and the economic standing of those countries overtly 
relies on the global market prices of oil and natural gas. Furthermore, at some point easily 
accessible sources of those resources will end. That means the economic model of those 
countries is not sustainable in the long term and for example if the market prices of natural 
resources drop, they will struggle to keep up their military. That makes Turkey a better candidate 
for a potential regional hegemon in the future.  
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Conceptualization and operationalization of the theory 
The hypothesis set forth in the thesis is that developing regional powers adopt a more active and 
aggressive foreign policy as time passes. Such behavior is caused by their economic growth that 
allows them to spend more money on resources needed for an active foreign policy. Increased 
amount of resources combined with the basic structural realist theory about states wanting to 
achieve hegemony leads them to more dominating foreign policy. As outlined before, states are 
the most concerned by security threats stemming from inside their own region and therefore, 
their increase of foreign political activity will focus on their own region. This causal relationship 
is possible describe with the following arrow diagram. 
Figure 1 Relations between variables 
 
In the current case economic growth is the independent variable, increase of capabilities is the 
intervening variable and activization of foreign policy is the dependent variable. That means 
economic growth brings forward an increase of capabilities which then causes a state’s foreign 
policy to become more active. 
There are different ways how to measure the economic state and the economic growth of a 
country. Usually the economic growth of a country is considered to be the increase in a nation’s 
total output. (Kuznets, 1947, pp. 26-27) Traditionally that is measured by using the gross 
domestic production (GDP). GDP is usually measured by taking all of the final expenditures of a 
state and therefore, essentially measures spending. Instead of GDP it is also for example possible 
to use GDI – gross domestic income that measures the earned income of the state and its’ 
inhabitants. (Fixler, Greenaway-McGrevy, & Grimm, 2015, pp. 1-2) . Besides that things like the 
governmental debt and the per capita earnings can be used for indicating the health of a state’s 
economy. In this thesis, the chosen way how to measure economic growth is using GDP. The 
reason for that is that GDP is the most widely used measurement of economic growth and 
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therefore the most accepted. It is also possible to find historically reliable data about that 
measurement better than for other potential measurement choices.  
Increase of capabilities encompasses in itself the increase of different resources needed for a 
state to pursue an active foreign policy. That includes in itself both the conventional military 
based “hard power” capabilities and the capabilities for conducting “soft” economic based 
foreign policy. 
Hard power capabilities have to do with a state being able to coerce others into acting in a 
desired way. The most obvious way how to use hard power is through military invasions or 
simply threatening other states with the use of military. Therefore, hard power of the state is 
power in the most classical sense. Soft power on the other hand is not about coercion of states, 
but rather about persuading other states in a diplomatic way to do ones’ bidding without the use 
of direct force. Soft power resources are the resources which allow a state to persuade others in 
such way. Those resources are mainly economic in nature, but can also be cultural or ideational. 
Soft and hard power do not have to exist in separation, they are often used together by states 
trying to influence other countries. (Wilson, 2008, pp. 114-115) 
To operationalize a state’s capabilities a set of indicators will be used. To assess the traditional 
hard power capabilities, increase of military resources will be analyzed. For that the amount of 
military expenditures, the size of military personnel and the Composite Index of National 
Capability will be used. The Composite Index of National Capability is an index developed by J. 
David Singer for the Correlates of War dataset and its’ aim is to measure how big share of 
world’s material capabilities does a state possess. It includes the following 6 subindicators: the 
population, the urban population, iron and steel production, primary energy consumption, 
military expenditure and military personnel of a country. The Composite Index of National 
Capabilities is used as one of the indicators in this thesis as it is one of the oldest and most 
respected indicators that aims to measure the capabilities of all states in the world. Looking at 
military expenditures and the size of a country’s army are the most common ways how to 
measure military power. (Hart, 1976, pp. 289-290) As soft power centers around money and 
financial resources, indicators used to explore the increase of soft power resources are the change 
of GDP and the change of trade volume between Turkey and other countries in the region. 
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Activization of foreign policy is conceptualized as a state increasingly taking part in international 
matters. That means having direct involvement in shaping of the events happening around them 
and taking and active and strong stance about various international issues. The indicators used in 
the thesis to measure the activity of a state’s foreign policy are the number of foreign visits 
conducted by state officials that exemplifies a direct desire to influence policy of other states and 
the international community at large and the number of mentioning of other states in press 
releases. A country that often writes in press releases about events happening abroad and taking a 
stance in them is a country that can be said to have a more active foreign policy. 
The quantitative data used in the analysis will be gathered from different sources. The basic data 
about population, GDP and economic growth of a state is collected from the World Bank 
databank. There are several reasons for choosing that databank. First of all, it is possible to get 
data about different indicators needed for the current thesis from there. That is preferable from 
gathering data from many different places as that reduces the potential chance of inconsistencies 
in data. Secondly, World Banks is a trusted and respectable data sort and therefore, it can be 
trusted to be accurate. Lastly, it has relatively small amount of missing data holes and therefore 
enables to have better analysis.  The Composite Index of National Capability is gathered from 
the latest 4.0 dataset released in 2007 by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. That 
institute has conducted research into military capabilities for a long time and has a favorable 
reputation about having as accurate as possible data. Information about Turkish foreign trade 
volume is gathered from the Turkish Statistical Institute as they are an official state agency of 
Turkey and have the most detailed and accurate information about Turkish foreign policy. 
Finally, the press releases used to determinate Turkish foreign political activity are gathered from 
the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site. Press releases published at the ministry’s web 
site is selected as a source of information for analysis as those writings reflect the official stances 
of the government about a large quantity of international matters.  
Research design 
The empirical part of this thesis will be split into two halves. In the first part of the analysis the 
change of Turkish military capabilities and economic power will be looked at and compared with 
other states in the region. It will be done as a quantitative analysis. The second half of the 
analysis will use Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press releases to see if the state’s foreign 
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political activity has increased. It will be done mainly in a quantitative way, but elements of 
qualitative analysis will be used on that part as well. 
Using quantitative analysis enables to find out the relationship between economic growth as the 
independent variable, increase of capabilities as the intervening variable and activization of 
foreign policy as the dependent variable and see if the hypothesis holds true. Numerical data 
allows drawing of clear conclusions and reduces the bias that stems from subjective 
interpretation of events. Quantitative analysis is especially useful in showing the link between 
economy and material capabilities as both of them can be easily measured in numbers. 
In the second part of the analysis some qualitative methods are being used as well. In addition to 
determining the level of Turkish foreign political activity in the region, this thesis attempts to 
find out more about Turkish relations with other states in the region. Through analyzing the press 
releases in a qualitative way, it is possible to see if Turkey has changed its’ foreign policy 
towards other states and if it has become more aggressive or not. 
The time period covered by this thesis is 2002 to 2015. That time period is chosen because 2002 
was the time when major changes in Turkish foreign policy slowly started to take place. During 
the elections of that year Justice and Development Party (AKP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) 
together with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power. The historical results of 2002 elections left 
all former parliament parties outside of the new parliament as they failed to get enough support 
to surpass the electoral threshold and AKP managed to form an absolute majority. That event 
marked the beginning of the time when AKP has controlled the Turkish foreign policy. At first 
they followed the “zero problems” policy under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoglu that as the 
name indicates, was peaceful and even rather passive. (Elver, 2010) That policy was dropped 
rather soon and a more active and forceful Neo-Ottomanism approach replaced the “zero 
problems” policy. (Zalewski, 2013) The first term of Erdoğan rule could be described by him 
seeking legitimization to his political agenda and attempts to move closer to the European Union 
which resulted in rather peaceful foreign policy. Starting from his second cabinet in 2007, 
Turkish foreign policy shifted towards using more hard power and taking active stances in the 
region. Due to that, it should be possible to see a change of foreign political activity during the 
time period between 2002 and 2015. 
30 
 
Empirics 
First of all, it is important to analyze whether Turkish capabilities to project power throughout 
the Middle East have increased in the recent times. Broadly speaking it is possible to speak 
separately about “soft” and “hard” power capabilities. Soft power consists of resources needed to 
achieve one’s desire in a peaceful way. That means mainly by diplomacy and economic 
coercion. The most important resource here is money as that is needed both to fund one’s 
diplomatic efforts and for providing other states incentives to change their policy in the desired 
way. (Nye, 2008, pp. 95-96) Hard power on the other hand has to do with the army and the 
ability to project’s ones military power when it is needed. Therefore, it is mainly about 
technology, weapons and the soldiers using them. To see how Turkey has improved its’ 
possibilities to project power in the Middle East region it is useful to look what the figures say 
about both economy and military. 
Turkish economic power 
Economic power can be used to increase a state’s power in different ways. Most importantly, 
achieving military supremacy requires money. Buying new military equipment, maintaining a 
standing army and undertaking foreign operations are all activities that require a lot of financial 
resources. Without a strong national economy, it is difficult for states to undertake those 
activities and their military strength will likely suffer. The importance of economy in military 
matters is likely to become even more important in the future due to the high cost of modern 
military technology and weaponry. 
Secondly, money can be used to achieve state’s goals in a peaceful manner.  Successful 
diplomacy needs finances to maintain effective foreign missions, aid programs and cultural 
exchange projects that all increase a state’s soft power. Furthermore, to reach desired diplomatic 
agreements it is often needed to coerce other states through providing them economic benefits 
(for example in the form of directly handing them money, giving it in the form of aid or 
preferential trade agreements) . 
Lastly, strong trade relationships between two countries make them increasingly codependent of 
each other. Through export it is possible to make other countries dependent of the exported 
products and goods (especially if they are natural resources). On the other hand, large volumes of 
import can make other countries financially dependent on the country that imports their goods. 
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The best way how to measure a country’s economic strength is to look at its’ gross domestic 
product and how it changes in time. In the case of Turkey it is possible to observe a relatively 
rapid (by western standards) and stable economic growth in the recent years. Since 2002, the 
Turkish economy has grown almost constantly. It only declined in 2009 when it shrunk by 4.8% 
and that was caused by the global economic crisis. On other years the economic growth has been 
at average around 5% per year, being the highest in 2004 at 9.4% and lowest in 2008 at 0.7%. 
(World Bank) According to the World Bank data, Turkish gross domestic product at market 
prices was 232.5 billion USD in 2002. By the year 2014 it had increased to 798.4 billion USD. 
During the time period between 2002 and 2014, Turkish gross domestic product more than 
tripled in dollar value. (World Bank) 
Table 2 Turkish GDP change in Lira (%)
5
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Turkey 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.2 2.9 
 
The previous data indicates that Turkish economic power has grown considerably in the recent 
years. To achieve a dominant place in regional affairs, it is not only important to increase one’s 
power, but to also do it quicker than the other states. Therefore, it is needed to analyze how 
Turkish economy has done relatively to other Middle Eastern countries. 
Generally speaking, the whole Middle Eastern region has seen a quick economic growth since 
2002 with most countries at least tripling their gross domestic product at market prices between 
then and the present day. Percentage wise, the largest gains have been made in Qatar, Iraq, 
Oman, Algeria and United Arab Emirates – the states that profit extensively from the export of 
natural resources (primarily oil). Those states are relatively small in the terms of population and 
had a relatively small economy to begin with. When looking at the increase of GDP in absolute 
terms, the picture is rather different. Turkey has managed to increase its’ GDP more than any 
other state in the region, closely followed by Saudi Arabia while Iran and UAE have also 
managed to increase their GDP by more than 200 billion USD. Therefore, Turkey has gained an 
economic advantage over other regional states in the recent years. It be noted however, that the 
                                                          
5
 Table compiled according to World Bank data 
32 
 
regional economic balance has only changed minimally. While in 2002 Turkish made up 18.6% 
of the region’s economy, in 2014 their share had increased only to 18.8%. 
Table 3 Gross domestic product change of Middle Eastern countries
6
 
Country 
GDP in 
2002 
(billion 
USD)7 
GDP in 
2014 
(billion 
USD)8 
GDP Increase 
between 2002 
and 2014 (billion 
USD) 
GDP Increase 
between 
2002 and 
2014 (%) 
Algeria 56.8 213.5 156.7 375.9 
Bahrain 9.6 33.9 24.3 353.1 
Egypt 87.9 286.5 198.6 325.9 
Iran 128.6 425.3 296.7 330.7 
Iraq 36.6 223.5 186.9 610.7 
Israel 121.1 305.7 184.6 252.4 
Jordan 10.2 35.8 25.6 351 
Kuwait 47.9 163.6 115.7 341.5 
Lebanon 20.1 45.7 25.6 227.4 
Libya 26.3 41.1 14.8 156.3 
Morocco 49.8 110 60.2 220.9 
Oman 21.6 81.8 60.2 378.7 
Qatar 23.5 210.1 186.6 894 
Saudi Arabia 214.6 746.2 531.6 347.7 
Syria 21.6 40.4 18.8 187 
Tunisia 23.1 48.6 25.5 210.4 
Turkey 232.5 798.4 565.9 343.4 
United Arab 
Emirates 109.8 399.5 289.7 363.8 
Yemen 10.7 36 25.3 336.4 
 
Beside gross domestic product, it is also worth to analyze the trade volume between Turkey and 
other Middle Eastern states. Like explained before, trade relations create codependence between 
states. In most cases the partner with smaller economy will become more dependent on the larger 
partner (Hirschman, 1969, pp. 24-26). As Turkey has the largest economy in the region, Turkey 
could potentially use its’ trading relations against smaller states as a political weapon.  
                                                          
6
 Table compiled according to World Bank data 
7
 GDP at market prices. 2004 data in the case of Iraq 
8
 GDP at market prices. 2007 data in the case of Syria and 2013 data in the case of Yemen 
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Turkish foreign trade with Middle Eastern countries saw a large increase between 2002 and 
2015. In 2002 Turkish exports to those countries combined was worth around 5 billion dollars 
while Turkish imports were valued at 3 billion USD. By 2015 Turkish exports had increased to 
36.5 billion USD and imports to 16 billion USD. Therefore, Turkey has started to export around 
7 times more goods to the region while importing about 5 times more from countries in the 
Middle East. (Turkish Statistical Institute) The largest export markets of Turkey in the region in 
2015 were Iraq, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia while Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel sent 
the most goods to Turkey. When comparing 2002 and 2015, it is possible to see that Israel has 
lost relative importance as a trade partner to Turkey. That is likely caused by the recent 
worsening of relations between those 2 countries.  
Table 4 Turkish foreign trade
9
 
  
Export 
2002 (millions 
of USD) 
Export 
2015 
(millions 
of USD) 
Import 
2002 
(millions 
of USD) 
Import 
2015 
(millions 
of USD) 
Algeria 514.3 1826.3 557.9 740.5 
Bahrain 16.9 225.4 19 104.5 
Egypt 326.4 3126.1 118.2 1215.9 
Iran 334 3664.6 921 6096.3 
Iraq 829.1 8555.3 41.7 296.5 
Israel 861.4 2698.4 544.5 1672.5 
Jordan 116.7 834.8 18.4 127.9 
Kuwait 139 482.6 26.5 141.4 
Lebanon 187.3 722.7 41.9 67.2 
Libya 165.1 1420.3 41.8 195.8 
Morocco 138.3 1337.9 68.3 710.6 
Oman 31.4 324.9 0.1 60.2 
Qatar 15.6 423.1 10.7 361 
Saudi Arabia 554.6 3473.1 120.8 2117.2 
Syria 266.8 1524.1 314.8 51.5 
Tunisia 121.1 819.2 71.8 144.1 
UAE 457.3 4681.5 100.8 2008.7 
Yemen 119.4 395.8 0.3 11 
Total 5194.7 36535.8 3018.3 16122.8 
 
                                                          
9
 Table compiled based on Turkish Statistical Institute’s data 
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A notable change can be seen when looking at the importance of Middle East and North Africa 
as Turkish trading partners. In 2002 trade with that region made up around 8.8% of all Turkish 
imports and about 9.1% of the exports. In 2015 the region had a share of 8.1% of all Turkish 
imports and 27.5% share of all of the exports. (Turkish Statistical Institute) Therefore, Middle 
East and North Africa have maintained their importance to Turkey as an import market, but have 
become a much more significant export market for Turkish goods. 
Increase of trade with the region means two things for Turkey. On one hand their foreign policy 
priorities are likely to follow trade patterns. The more countries trade with each other, the more 
invested they are in having friendly relations and maintaining stability. Therefore, to protect own 
trade interests, Turkey is likely to adopt a more active role in the Middle East to safeguard the 
stability of the region. On the other hand stronger economic ties also mean that Turkey will have 
more opportunities to project its’ soft power capabilities in the region for whatever goals the 
state desires to achieve. 
Turkish military power 
Military power is definitely one of the most important things a state needs to achieve an 
internationally dominant position. Most obviously, military power is needed to solve conflicts in 
a violent manner when diplomacy fails to work and to protect ones’ own state against enemies. 
Even when conducting international diplomacy, having military power is important, as it gives a 
state a better starting point at negotiations and increase credibility of threats and demands they 
make. (Robert J. & Kelly M., 2009, pp. 1-3) 
As military is important for the survival of the state, it is notoriously difficult to find reliable data 
about it. All countries want to keep at least some parts of the information regarding their military 
secret. Otherwise they could reveal vital information to ones’ enemies.  Therefore, there is often 
a need to use estimations made by experts and researchers when speaking about militaries of 
different countries. As Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries have problems with the lack 
of transparency in governance, estimates about those countries can be a bit off the mark. While 
estimates are not perfect, they are made by experts who know what they are doing and therefor 
still give a good general picture about military capabilities of countries. This study uses the 
estimates of military spending done by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute as they 
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have reliably assessed military spending by different countries for a long time and have as few as 
possible data holes in their databases.  
Military spending is the easiest indicator to use as a proxy of state’s military power. (Tellis, 
Bially, Layne, & McPherson, 2000, p. 136) Like any approach it has its’ own weak sides. That 
approach assumes that every country uses money with the same efficiency and that states’ 
military equipment turns obsolete fairly quickly due to the advancement of technology. In reality 
that is not necessarily the case, but there aren’t much better ways how to compare military power 
than that.  
In 2002 Turkey was the third biggest military spender in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and 
Israel. Turkey ranking in military spending in 2014 remains the same while United Arab 
Emirates replace Israel as the 2
nd
 biggest spender on military. During the time period Turkish 
military spending has increased around 2.5 times, which is a little below the average in the 
region. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014) By looking at the increase of 
military spending in absolute terms, Turkey has the biggest increase after Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates. Therefore, it seems that as time passes, Turkey gains an upper hand 
against states like Iran, Iraq and Egypt, but may fall behind rich Gulf states in military power.   
Turkish military spending as a percentage from GDP has changed a little over the time. In late 
1990s and early 2000s, Turkey spent around 4% of its’ GDP for military. Due to the 2001 
financial crisis, that level of spending started to decrease rapidly until 2006. Since then Turkish 
military spending level has stayed around 2% of the GDP. (Yentürk, 2014, pp. 14-15) Therefore, 
the economic growth of Turkey and the increase of its’ military spending have been strongly 
linked in the recent years. 
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Table 5 Military spending of countries in the Middle East
10
 
Country 
Military 
spending in 
2002 (millions 
of USD)11 
Military 
spending in 
2014 
(millions of 
USD)12 
Increase 
in the 
time 
period 
(%) 
Increase in 
the time 
period 
(millions of 
USD) 
Algeria                        2101 11862 565 9761 
Bahrain                        443 1433 323 990 
Egypt                          2831 4961 175 2130 
Iran                           3244 12719 392 9475 
Iraq                           614 9516 1550 8902 
Israel                         9949 15908 160 5959 
Jordan                         522 1268 243 746 
Kuwait                         2822 5824 206 3002 
Lebanon                        907 2121 234 1214 
Libya                          453 3302 729 2849 
Morocco                        1475 4050 275 2575 
Oman                           2491 9623 386 7132 
Qatar                          761 1877 247 1116 
Saudi 
Arabia                   18502 80762 437 62260 
Syria                          1103 2495 226 1392 
Tunisia                        345 906 263 561 
Turkey                         9050 22618 250 13568 
UAE                            5354 22755 425 17401 
Yemen                          737 1715 233 978 
 
Second indicator that is often used to represent a state’s military power is the size of its’ armed 
forces (that includes both the military and paramilitary type forces). The manpower of a state 
shows how large force a country could send out to fight in the case of an actual military conflict. 
Even though weaponry and technology are becoming increasingly important in modern warfare, 
it is not possible to win a direct conflict without having enough soldiers. 
                                                          
10
 Table compiled based on SIPRI data 
11
 Iraq’s data from 2004 
12
 Iran’s data from 2012, Kuwait’s data from 2013, Qatar’s data from 2010 and Syria’s data from 2011 
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The amount of military personnel is connected with the population of the state and therefore 
usually doesn’t change rapidly. Between 2002 and 2013 Turkish military personnel has dropped 
from 664800 to 612800 which means a decrease of slightly less than 10%. (World Bank) Other 
states of the region have mostly maintained a stable amount of soldiers. The exceptions here are 
Iraq and Syria as they have lost most of their army in recent violent conflicts. As those 2 states 
are direct neighbors of Turkey, it is possible to say that the balance of military power has 
somewhat shifted in Turkish favor. 
Table 6 Military personnel of states in the Middle East
13
 
Country 
Military 
personnel in 
2002 
Military personnel 
in 2013 Change 
Algeria 317900 317200 -700 
Bahrain 20900 19460 -1440 
Egypt 773000 835500 62500 
Iran 560000 563000 3000 
Iraq 432000 177600 -254400 
Israel 169500 184500 15000 
Jordan 110200 115500 5300 
Kuwait 22100 22600 500 
Lebanon 84800 80000 -4800 
Libya 76500 7000 -69500 
Morocco 246300 245800 -500 
Oman 46100 47000 900 
Qatar 12400 11800 -600 
Saudi Arabia 215000 251500 36500 
Syria 427000 178000 -249000 
Tunisia 47000 47800 800 
Turkey 664800 612800 -52000 
UAE 41500 63000 21500 
Yemen 136500 137900 1400 
 
 There is a strong relationship between the economic situation in Turkey and the amount of some 
power projection resources Turkey has. Most notably the amount of money Turkey has and the 
amount of money it spends on military is strongly linked. During ever year that Turkish GDP 
grew, the military spending increased as well. When the Turkish economy shrink (measured in 
USD) in 2009 and 2014, so did the military spending. A regression analysis made based on the 
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 Compiled based on World Bank data 
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table below indicates that at average the increase of Turkish GDP by 58,6 billion USD increased 
military spending by 1 billion USD. The linear regression has an R-squared of 0,97 that indicates 
a very strong link between military spending and GDP. On the other hand economic growth and 
the size of Turkish military seem to be unlinked as while the Turkish economy keeps growing, 
the number of military personnel decreases. 
Table 7 Turkish GDP and military spendings 
 
Table 8 Relation between GDP and military spendings 
 
 
In conclusion it is possible to say that neither the economic nor militaristic balance of power in 
the Middle East have changed a lot between 2002 and 2015. Turkey was and still is the largest 
economic power in the region, but has not increased its’ lead by a lot. One thing that has changed 
is that Turkey has started to export considerably more goods to other states in the region and that 
may increase Turkish soft power capabilities. Turkey has not managed to achieve supremacy in 
y = 58.589x - 271.37 
R² = 0.969 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 5 10 15 20
G
D
P
 b
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
U
SD
 
Military spending billions of USD 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Military 
spending 
(billion 
USD) 9.1 10.3 10.9 12.1 13.4 15.3 17.1 16.4 17.9 17.3 18 18.6 17.8 
GDP 
(billion 
USD) 232.5 303 392.2 483 530.9 647.2 730.3 614.6 731.2 774.8 788.9 823.2 798.4 
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the region military wise either and is relatively as strong now as in 2002. The most important 
development has been that Iraq and Syria – 2 states bordering Turkey – have become noticeably 
militarily weaker. That may allow Turkey to project its’ power in the territory of those states 
more easily, but also possess a security risk due to Iraq and Syria failing to maintain stability in 
their own states. There is a strong link between Turkish military spending and its’ economic 
growth, but such connection does not exist between economic growth and the number of military 
personnel. 
Turkish activity in the Middle East 
In addition to having strong military and enough economic resources, a country that desires to 
become an important actor in regional matters, also has to be active in its’ region. Having a lot of 
resources without using them does not help a state to achieve a leading role in its’ region, but 
actively taking a stance in regional matters and using those resources to assert one’s own 
influence in the region does. Therefore, it is worth to look into how Turkey has conducted its’ 
foreign political activity in the Middle East region and if anything has changed in the recent 
years. 
There is no straightforward way of measuring how actively a state conducts its’ foreign policy. 
Foreign policy encompasses a wide spectrum of activities in itself, starting from simply 
committing a speech act about some topic to signing trade agreements to undertaking hostile 
activities like invasions or creating sanctions. This thesis is going to use two methods of 
measuring general foreign political activity. First of them is measuring visits made by state 
officials to foreign countries. Foreign visits by state officials are important as during them 
diplomacy is conducted and different types of agreements are signed. Frequent visits to a specific 
foreign country show that relations with that state are being prioritized and that there are enough 
relevant topics between the 2 countries to discuss. During foreign visits it is possible for state 
officials to actively shape the relations between countries in question and therefore to assert their 
state’s foreign political influence. 
Second thing that will be analyzed is the political statements made by the foreign ministry of 
Turkey regarding other countries. There are many events happening all over the world daily, but 
not everything is considered to be important enough to give opinion about. Therefore, there is 
always some sort of selection about what specific events a state should take an official stance on 
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and what events are not overly important. An active foreign policy inside of a region means that 
a state prioritizes events happening inside their own region and takes political stances about 
regional matters. It could be hardly said that for example Turkey has an active foreign policy 
towards another country if that state is never mentioned by the Turkish foreign policy 
establishment.   
To find out where Turkish officials are conducting foreign visits to and what countries are the 
spoken about in the Turkish foreign political communication, official press releases found on the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web page are used.14 Turkey publishes press releases in 
Turkish and in English, but for this thesis only the ones written in English are used. Ministry of 
Foreign Affair’s press releases are a reliable source about Turkish foreign policy for several 
reasons. First of all, they are published by the foreign ministry and therefore always reflect the 
official stances and policy adopted by the Turkish government. That differs from for example 
analyzing the speech acts or travel destinations of a single politician as politicians have the 
tendency to sometimes express their own personal opinion or go against the official policies of 
the state.  
Secondly, the ministry of foreign affairs only publishes press releases about the most important 
events and visit. Before publishing press statements the ministry actually has to consider what is 
important in relations to Turkish foreign policy and what is not. Therefore, the press releases 
ignore everything that does not matter for the Turkish foreign political establishment. That 
mechanic acts as a sort of a filter removing everything unimportant. Not every visit by the prime 
minister or president is important and a lot of visits by lower level officials can be considered 
important based on the context. Using the press releases by the ministry means that they have 
done the work of separating important from the meaningless. 
Lastly, using official press releases offers a large, but finite amount of material to analyze. The 
number of press releases is large enough to enable meaningful analysis based on them, yet 
clearly delimitate so there are less questions about what to include in the analysis and what to 
leave out. 
                                                          
14
 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?248a41bb-6744-
4d91-91f7-500bd7a2cac1 
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The press releases used in the analysis come from the years between 2007 and 2015. Before the 
year 2007, the number of press releases given out by the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs in 
English was too low to enable a meaningful way to analyze them quantitatively. In the years 
between 2007 and 2015, the number of press releases in English total at 1993. The number of 
press releases varies yearly and ranges from 86 in 2011 to 399 in 2014. It is worth noting that the 
difference in number of press releases in English stems from two different factors. Turkey has 
started posting press releases more frequently in their web site in general – that means they are 
taking a stance in more international topics than before. Secondly, it seems that the ministry of 
foreign affairs does not publish all of their press releases in both Turkish and English. As time 
has gone on, the percentage of press releases being published in both languages has increased 
from around 60% to nearly 100%. The only year when there is a noticeably small amount of 
press releases translated into English is in 2011 when only 26,9% of the press releases appear in 
English. The following year for example already 97,3% of the ministry’s press releases were 
translated. The number of press releases analyzed by year is brought out in the table below. 
Table 9 Number of press releases
15
 
Year 
Press 
releases in 
English 
Press 
releases 
in Turkish 
% of press 
releases 
translated 
into 
English 
2007 139 184 75.5 
2008 153 223 68.6 
2009 135 247 54.7 
2010 149 298 50 
2011 86 320 26.9 
2012 287 295 97.3 
2013 337 347 97.1 
2014 399 407 98 
2015 308 318 96.9 
Total 1993 2639 75.5 
Visits by Turkish state officials 
To analyze visits conducted by the Turkish state officials, English language press releases from 
2007 to 2015 were used. At first press releases that contained the word “visit” in their title were 
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 Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site 
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looked for. Out of those only the press releases that indicated that a Turkish state official visited 
another country were included in the analysis (the press releases that were about a foreign 
official visiting Turkey were disregarded as they do not show activity from the Turkish side).  
By using this method, 173 suitable press releases were found. Out of those 33 were about 
Turkish officials visiting various Middle East countries and 140 about visits to other parts of the 
world.
16
 That meant at average visits to the Middle East made up 19.1% of all of  the visits 
reported by the press releases.  There was a general trend of increasing number of reported visits 
to both the Middle East and to the whole world as time moved on. While in 2007 only 7 foreign 
visits were reported, in 2013 already 38 were noted. In 2010 there was no press release where the 
headline indicated a Turkish state official visiting another country in the Middle East, in 2013 
and 2014 there were 9 such reports a year. 
Table 10 Visits by Turkish officials
17
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Total visits 7 17 10 8 7 23 38 34 29 173 
Visits to the 
Middle East 
3 2 1 0 2 4 9 9 3 33 
 
As previously stated, the number of total press releases given out by the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had a great yearly variation. Therefore, one must also account for that and look 
at the number of visits to the Middle East as a share from all of the press releases and as a share 
from all of the reported foreign visits. At average during that time period around 1,7% of all 
press released were about visits to countries in the Middle East. That share was the highest in 
2013 at 2,7% and lowest in 2010 at 0% (as there were no reported visits to the region). Out of all 
foreign visits the highest share of visits were made to the Middle East in 2007 when 42,9% of the 
visits went to the region and the lowest share was seen again in 2010. When using a regression 
analysis to explore the correlation between time and visits to the states in the Middle East, no 
significant and strong linear correlation was found. 
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 All press releases referring to foreign visits by Turkish officials are listed in annex 1 
17
 Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site 
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Table 11 Share of visits to the Middle East
18
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
% of visits 
to the 
Middle 
East from 
all visits 
42.9 11.8 10 0 28.6 17.4 23.7 26.5 10.3 19.1 
% of 
press 
releases 
to Middle 
East from 
all press 
releases 
2.2 1.3 0.7 0 2.3 1.4 2.7 2.3 1 1.7 
 
Looking at the states Turkish officials have been reported to visit, a few general trends emerge. 
The most popular countries to visit are Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. All of them are relatively 
influential and powerful countries in the region. Therefore, it is likely that these states have an 
important place in Turkish foreign policy and also get visited more often than other states 
because of that. Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Tunisia were also visited relatively often 
compared to the other states. However, no visits to Algeria, Israel, Morocco or United Arab 
Emirates were deemed important enough to make a separate press release about. Most of those 
states happen to be rather far away from Turkey and are not major geopolitical players in the 
region. No visits to Israel could be explained by the hostile relations between the two states. 
From the following chart it is possible to see that the number of visits by Turkish officials to 
states in the region have become more frequent as time passes. A large increase of activity is 
seen especially since 2012. The only 2 countries where the majority of reported visits happened 
before 2012 were Egypt and Lebanon.   
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 Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site 
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Table 12 Number of visits to Middle East countries by year
19
 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Algeria                   0 
Bahrain     1       1 1   3 
Egypt 1                 1 
Iran           1 2 1   4 
Iraq 1            1 2   4 
Israel                   0 
Jordan             1 1   2 
Kuwait 1           1   1 3 
Lebanon 1 1       1       3 
Libya               2   2 
Morocco                   0 
Oman   1         1     2 
Palestine             1     1 
Qatar             1 1 1 3 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1       1 1 1 2   6 
Syria             1     1 
Tunisia         1     2   3 
UAE                   0 
Yemen     1     1     1 3 
 
General mentions in press releases 
To analyze the general interest of Turkish foreign political establishment in countries of the 
Middle East, press releases from 2007 to 2015 will be analyzed again. This time all of the 
English language press releases that explicitly mentioned the name of another country (or a 
demonym stemming from the name of a country) in the Middle East in their title were selected.  
That means press releases mentioning vague geographical regions or cities were left out of the 
analysis. Out of the 1993 press releases written between 2007 and 2014, 496 of them fulfilled the 
stated criterion.
20
 Around a quarter of all Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs press releases in 
English were directly about countries in the Middle East.  The largest share of press releases 
concerning the Middle East countries was seen in 2012 when 31,3% of the writings were about 
countries in that region. The lowest interest in the region was found in 2010 when only 13,4% of 
the press releases were about the Middle East. In general there is a rather noticeable positive 
correlation between time and the share of press releases mentioning Middle Eastern countries in 
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 Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site 
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 All such press releases are named in annex 2 
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the title. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Middle East in general has become more written 
about and therefor more important for Turkish foreign policy establishment. 
Table 13 Correlation between the share of press releases about Middle East countries and time 
 
Looking at mentions of individual states in the region, Iraq is clearly the most popular country. It 
is mentioned a total of 96 times and it was the most mentioned Middle Eastern country in 2007, 
2009, 2013 and 2014. Therefore, it can be said that Iraq has had an important place in Turkish 
foreign policy for the entirety of the analyzed period. Second most mentioned country by Turkey 
was Israel at 67 mentions. Israel together with Lebanon were the most mentioned countries in 
2008. Similarly to Iraq, Israel was often written about during the entire time period. Third most 
mentioned state by Turkey was Syria. Unlike the two most popular states, Syria was not high in 
Turkish agenda during the entire time period. It was the most written about state in 2012 and got 
many mentions after that year, but was not written about much before 2012. That had to do with 
the escalation of Syrian civil war in 2012 which was an important event for Turkey. Libya and 
Yemen were the only other countries mentioned more than 40 times. Both of those countries 
became a focus of Turkey after 2012 and most of their mentioning regards the civil conflicts 
happening in those states.  
On the other hand there were several countries that weren’t even mentioned at average once a 
year. Those countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and United 
Arab Emirates. Noticeably those countries all have a rather small population and low level of 
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power compared to other states in the region. While some of those states like Algeria and 
Morocco were involved in the Arab Spring protest, it was simply not enough to get the attention 
of Turkish foreign policy establishment – Algeria for example was not even mentioned once 
during 2010-2012 when Algerian protests took place. 
 Table 14 Mentions of Middle East countries by year
21
  
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Algeria 2 1         1 1 1 6 
Bahrain     1   1 1 2 2 1 8 
Egypt 1       1 6 12 8 10 38 
Iran 3 1 3 6 1 5 7 6 2 34 
Iraq 12 4 6 3 1 16 26 20 8 96 
Israel 1 11 3 10 2 20 6 7 7 67 
Jordan   1 1       2 1 1 6 
Kuwait             2 1 2 5 
Lebanon 1 11 1     3 7 1 2 26 
Libya         3 2 7 14 15 41 
Morocco         1 1       2 
Oman   1         1 1   3 
Palestine 6   1 3 1 14 3 8 3 39 
Qatar             2 1 2 5 
Saudi 
Arabia 2       1 3 1 1 6 14 
Syria   5       26 13 10 3 57 
Tunisia   2     1 1 2 8 4 18 
UAE   1     1     1   3 
Yemen     4     9 8 11 14 46 
 Total 28 38 20 22 14 107 102 102 81 514 
 
In addition to simply finding out the frequency of mentions of different states in the Middle East, 
an analysis was conducted about the attitude of Turkey towards other states in the region. For 
that methodology was adopted from Stefano Braghiroli and Irena Fiket. (Braghiroli & Fiket, 
2012, pp. 113-114) Turkish attitude towards other states in the region was taken as a variable 
ranging on a 3 point scale from 1 (positive attitude) to -1 (negative attitude) 
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For every press release, it was determined if the general attitude of message was positive, neutral 
or negative towards the country that was written about. In case of countries that were undergoing 
a civil war (for example Syria and Iraq) the opinion expressed towards the reigning government 
of the state was viewed. 
A press release was determined to have a positive tone if it included words or phrases that 
indicated Turkish government’s approval with the course of events happening in the mentioned 
country. Such words and phrases were for example” welcome” (as in No:124 - 11 July 2008 “We 
welcome the establishment of the national unity government in the framework of the agreement 
that was reached among the Lebanese groups in Doha last May”.), being pleased (as in No: 271, 
10 October 2015 ”We are very pleased that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2015 was awarded to the 
civil society group, the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet.”), “congratulate” (as in No: 364, 26 
November 2014, “We congratulate the people of Tunisia, who went to the polls for the first time 
in order to directly elect the President of the Republic, for their successful passing the test of 
democracy.”) and calling something a “significant step” (as in No: 372, 03 December 2014, “We 
consider the holding of elections in Bahrain for the Council of Representatives and 
municipalities which constitute the most important basis of political participation in the country 
as a significant step taken towards national dialogue, reconciliation and reform.”). In addition to 
these types of words and phrases, a press release was considered to have a positive tone if it 
explicitly characterized another state or its’ inhabitants in an overtly positive manner that 
emphasizes good relations between Turkey and the state in question.. Such characterization was 
for example the phrase “friendly and brotherly” (as in No: 210, 21 July 2015 “Turkey is in 
solidarity with friendly and brotherly Algeria in its fight against terrorism.) 
Press releases were determined to have a negative tone if they included words or phrases that 
indicated Turkish government’s disapproval with the course of events happening in the 
mentioned country. Those phrases for example included “deeply concerned (as in No: 33, 1 
February 2012 “We are deeply concerned by the sharp escalation of the Syrian Administration’s 
acts of violence against its own people and the consequent loss of lives.”), strongly condemn (as 
in No: 252, 13 September 2015, “We strongly condemn the intrusion of the Israeli security 
forces into Haram Al-Sharif in the morning hours of 13 September clashing with the Muslim 
groups inside and blocking the entry of the Muslims for a certain period of time by using force.” 
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and protest (as in No: 115, 31 May 2010  “We protest in the strongest terms the use of force by 
the Israeli Defense Forces against the civilians from many countries who want to transport 
humanitarian assistance to the people in Gaza…”) It is worth noting that a press release was 
considered to have a negative tone only if such words and phrases were directed against the 
government of a foreign country. That means the press releases where Turkey condemned 
terrorist attacks against civilians were not automatically considered to have a negative tone 
towards the countries where the attacks happened. Those press releases were considered to have 
a negative tone when the local government was blamed about not stopping the attacks that 
happened. 
Press releases were considered to be neutral in two different cases. In the first instance, the press 
releases were either very short or just passingly mentioned the name of a country.  In such cases 
there simply wasn’t anything that indicated an opinion about the mentioned country. For 
example the entire text of press release No: 217, 3 August 2013 was “H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey will pay a visit to Iran to 
attend, on behalf of H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey, the 
inauguration ceremony to be held in Tehran on 4 August 2013 for Dr. Hassan Rouhani who won 
the Presidential Elections in Iran.” Secondly, press releases were considered neutral when they 
included mixed positive and negative opinions towards a country. 
For further analyzing, press releases that carried a positive tone were given the value of 1, neutral 
press releases the value of 0 and negative press releases the value of -1. Then a yearly average 
score of press releases for every country and year combination was taken. A score of -1 to -0,34 
was determined to signify Turkey having a negative opinion towards a state, -0,33 to 0,33 
indicated a neutral opinion and 0,33 to 1 was a sign of friendly relations between Turkey and 
another state. (Braghiroli & Fiket, 2012, pp. 113-114) Based on that a table was compiled that 
shows how Turkish relations with other states of the region have changed in time.
22
 
  
                                                          
22
 All press releases together with a rating of tone given to them can be seen in annex 2 
49 
 
 
Table 15 Attitude of Turkey towards countries in the Middle East by year
23
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Algeria 0.5 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 1 0.5 
Bahrain N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0.5 1 0 0.43 
Egypt 0 N/A N/A N/A 1 0.83 -0.5 0.13 -0.4 -0.1 
Iran 0.33 0 0.67 0.33 0 0.2 0.43 0.33 0.5 0.35 
Iraq 0.17 0.5 0.33 1 0 0.81 0.46 0.5 0.29 0.48 
Israel -0.5 -0.27 -1 -0.5 -1 -0.9 
-
0.86 
-0.79 -1 -0.7 
Jordan N/A 1 0 N/A N/A N/A 0.5 0 0 0.33 
Kuwait 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.5 0 0 0.17 
Lebanon 0.5 0.364 1 N/A 1 0.33 0.14 1 1 0.43 
Libya N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.67 1 0.57 0.571 
-
0.07 
0.37 
Morocco N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0 N/A N/A N/A 0.5 
Oman N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 
Palestine 0.17 N/A 0 1 0 0.14 1 0.88 0.67 0.46 
Qatar N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0.5 0.2 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0.33 0 1 0.67 0.43 
Syria N/A 0.2 N/A N/A N/A -0.8 -0.5 -0.73 0 -0.6 
Tunisia N/A 0.5 N/A N/A 0 0 1 1 0.75 0.78 
UAE N/A 0 N/A N/A 1 N/A N/A -1 N/A 0 
Yemen N/A N/A 0.75 N/A N/A 1 0.88 0.91 0.43 0.76 
 
In general Turkey seems to have mainly positive relations with majority of the states in the 
region. The only two countries that had most press releases indicating a negative Turkish opinion 
were Israel and Syria. Israeli actions warranted a negative reaction by the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs during the entire observed time period. Most of the negativity was concerning 
Israeli actions in Palestinian territories. Turkey frequently condemned the use of force against 
Palestinian civilians and protested against the illegal Israeli settlements being built.
24
 On the 
other hand, the same press releases often mentioned Palestine in a positive light and depicted 
Palestinians as victims of oppressive Israeli occupation. 
                                                          
23
 Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site 
24
 For example No: 235, 8 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Operation Initiated by Israel against Gaza and No: 
354, 13 November 2014, Press Release Regarding Israel’s Aggressive Acts in Jerusalem and its Illegal settlement 
activities 
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In the case of Syria things were a little bit different. The country didn’t get much attention from 
Turkey until 2012 and before that year, Syria was depicted in a neutral or even somewhat 
positive way (for example in statements concerning the Syrian-Israeli peace talks).
25
 However, 
since 2012 and the escalation of Syrian civil war, the opinion of Turkey towards the Syrian 
government sharply declined. Instead of the previously neutral to positive stance, Turkey started 
to harshly criticize the actions of al-Assad and voiced their support for the toppling of the 
government.
26
 The rhetoric concerning Syria changed starkly and the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy line of non-involvement was dropped. 
Other countries that saw a decline of relations with Turkey were Egypt and Iraq. Before 2013, 
Egypt was mostly written about in a positive light. For example in 2012 many of the press 
releases were about the democratic elections in Egypt and welcoming the new administration of 
Mohammed Morsi.
27
 Since the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état relations between the two countries 
have deteriorated and the actions undertaken by general el-Sisi’s government are mostly 
condemned by Turkey. 
28
 
Iraq was the most mentioned state in the Middle East in all of the press releases. Most of those 
mentioned Iraq in a neutral or a positive way and a large share of the writings were about the 
Turkish government condemning terrorism against the “brotherly” people of Iraq.29 In 2014 a lot 
of the press releases also welcomed political developments in Iraq.
30
 However in 2014 and 2015 
Turkey also started criticizing Iraq for not allowing Turkish forces to carry out attacks against 
the Kurds in Iraq. The Iraqi government was accused of taking no actions against PKK and 
therefore helping the terrorist organization.
31
 Due to that Turkey started to adopt a noticeably 
more aggressive and critical stance towards Iraq. 
                                                          
25
 For example NO:136 - 30 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the Fourth Round of the Indirect Peace Talks 
Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey 
26
 For example No: 74, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the Interim Government by 
the Syrian National Coalition 
27
 For example No. 25, 24 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Elections for the People’s Assembly Held in 
Egypt 
28
 For example No: 192, 4 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Egypt 
29
 For example No: 326, 21 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
30
 For example No: 268, 12 August 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Political Developments in Iraq 
31
 For example No: 220, 31 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Statement of the Iraqi Government about 
Turkey’s Operations towards the PKK Targets 
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On the other hand Turkey was very positive about the governments of Tunisia and Yemen. In the 
case of Tunisia, Turkey welcomed the democratic reforms undertaken by the country since 
2013.
32
 Reforms in that country were highlighted as beneficial to the entire region and the 
support of Turkey to the government of Tunisia was often repeated.  In the case of Yemen most 
of the press releases were either about terrorist attacks conducted in that country or about the 
civil war.
33
 Turkey has clearly taken a stance that supports the side of the government in the 
ongoing conflict and therefor mostly expressed support to the government forces and condemned 
all of the terrorist attacks against Yemeni government and “brotherly” people. 
Libya, Iran, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are rest of the states that were mentioned more than 25 
times and all of them received neutral to positive reactions from Turkey. Press releases about 
Libya roughly fell into 2 types. In first of them, the press releases reported about terrorist attacks 
where Turkey offered its’ condolences in a rather neutral way and urged all parties to seek 
peaceful resolution to their conflict.
 34
 The second type of press releases welcomed political 
advances made by the government in national reconciliation and democratization.
35
 Iran likewise 
was mentioned in many neutral press releases about terrorist attacks happening on its’ territory.36 
The positive messages were mainly about reaching a deal concerning Iran’s nuclear project, but 
also for example welcoming the selection of Hassan Rouhani as the new president of Iran.
37
 
Lebanon was mainly mentioned in 2008 both in a positive light regarding elections and 
formation of a new unity government and in a more neutral way urging all of the parties of 
clashes happening in Lebanon to maintain peace
38
. Saudi Arabia had the most mentions of state 
visits happening between Turkey and any other country in the region. Press releases concerning 
those visits however were often short and only stated that bilateral relations are going to be 
discussed.
39
 Many press releases also mentioned terrorist attacks happening in Saudi Arabia.
40
 
                                                          
32
For example No: 31, 28 January 2014, Press Release Regarding the New Tunisian Constitution 
33
 For example No: 303, 23 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen 
34
 For example No: 69, 20 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Libyan 
City of Qubbah 
35
 For example No: 170, 27 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Establishment of the New Libyan Government 
36
 For example No: 191, 18 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in İran and 
37
 For example No: 101, 17 May 2010, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Programme No: 
172, 16 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Presidential Elections in Iran 
38
 For example NO:95 - 29 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the New Government in Lebanon andNo: 181, 24 
June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Fighting in the Lebanese City of Sidon. 
39
 For example No: 163, 9 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Saudi Arabia 
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Compared to other state in the region, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were more likely to be called 
“friendly” and “brotherly”. 
Other states in the region received a relatively low amount of mentions and therefore, it is 
difficult to make sweeping conclusions about Turkish foreign policy changes regarding those 
states.  Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
each got an average of less than 1 mention per year.  Press releases about those states were 
usually rather short and neutral or somewhat positive in tone. Out of those states only the United 
Arab Emirates received strong criticism by Turkey. In 2014 UAE was criticized for supporting 
the military coup in Egypt and making statements against Turkey supporting democratic 
uprisings in the region.
41
 That may indicate Turkey adopting a more hostile stance against the 
United Arab Emirates, but it is not possible to reliably determinate it based on only 1 press 
release. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
40
 For exampleNo: 167, 30 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Saudi 
Arabia 
41
 No: 306, 27 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
United Arab Emirates 
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Table 16 Attitude of Turkey towards states of the Middle East
42
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Algeria + + N/A N/A N/A N/A = = + + 
Bahrain N/A N/A = N/A N/A = + + = + 
Egypt = N/A N/A N/A + + - = - = 
Iran + = + + = = + + + + 
Iraq = + + + = + + + = + 
Israel - = - - - - - - - - 
Jordan N/A + = N/A N/A N/A + = = + 
Kuwait = N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A + = = = 
Lebanon + + + N/A + + = + + + 
Libya N/A N/A N/A N/A + + + + = + 
Morocco N/A N/A N/A N/A + = N/A N/A N/A + 
Oman N/A = N/A N/A N/A N/A = = N/A = 
Palestine = N/A = + = = + + + + 
Qatar N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A = = + = 
Saudi Arabia = N/A N/A N/A = + = + + + 
Syria N/A = N/A N/A N/A - - - = - 
Tunisia N/A + N/A N/A = = + + + + 
UAE N/A = N/A N/A + N/A N/A - N/A = 
Yemen N/A N/A + N/A N/A + + + + + 
 
In conclusions it is possible to say that in the time period between 2007 and 2015 Turkish 
relations with most of the states in the Middle East have not changed much. However, Turkey 
has become more hostile towards Syria and Egypt and has started to publish critical messages 
directed at those 2 states. Therefore, it is possible to say that the rhetoric of Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has become somewhat more aggressive towards at least some of the state in the 
region. 
Economic growth and activity in the region 
In the theoretical part of this thesis a hypothesis about the connection of economic growth and 
level of foreign political activity of a state was made. It was theorized that the more a country’s 
economy grows, the more active it will become in foreign policy. Therefore, the connection 
between GDP growth and the 2 indicators used to measure Turkish activity in the region (share 
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 Table compiled based on the press releases found on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web site 
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of visits to the Middle East and the share of mentioning of Middle East states) will be explored 
here.  
The following graph shows the covariance of Turkish economic growth and the share of Turkish 
press releases mentioning visits to states in the Middle East in their title. The visits made by the 
officials are represented on the graph with a delay of 1 year. That is done because reacting to the 
economic situation of the state takes time and adjustments in the foreign policy can’t be done 
instantly. The graph clearly shows that the economic growth in the previous year and the number 
of visits done by the Turkish officials have a strong connection. Notably the economic regression 
of 2009 is followed by a decrease of foreign visits in 2010 and as the economic growth picks up 
in the following years, so do Turkish officials become more active in travelling.  
Table 17 Economic growth and share of visits to the Middle East 
 
Running a simple linear regression analysis between those 2 variables shows that at average 1% 
of economic growth increases the share of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press releases 
mentioning visits to countries in the Middle East by 0,13%. The correlation between those 2 
variables is rather significant and has an R-squared of 0,41. That means roughly 41% of the 
variance in visits to Middle Eastern countries could be explained by the economic growth of 
Turkey.  
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Table 18 Economic growth and visits to the Middle East 
 
Likewise, when graphing the percentage of Foreign Ministry’s press releases mentioning states 
in the Middle East with Turkish economic growth with a 1 year delay, a covariance can be seen. 
The share of writings about states in the Middle East dropped considerably after the 2009 
economic crisis and reached its’ highest peak in 2011 after two years of strong economic growth.  
Table 19 Economic growth and mentions of Middle East 
 
Linear regression analysis between those 2 variables shows that there is a positive correlation. 
For every 1% of economic growth, the frequency of Middle East countries being mentioned in 
y = 0.1309x + 1.0397 
R² = 0.4082 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
%
 o
f 
p
re
ss
 r
e
le
as
e
s 
m
e
n
ti
o
n
in
g 
vi
si
ts
 t
o
 
M
id
d
le
 E
as
t 
% of economic growth 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
Year 
Economic growth of
previous year
Share of mentions of
Middle East
countries out of all
press releases
56 
 
the press release titles of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased by 0,64 percentage 
points. The R-squared of this correlation is 0,17 which indicates a 17% explanation power of the 
chosen model.  
 
Table 20 Economic growth and the share of press releases mentioning Middle East states 
 
The correlation between economic growth and the indicators of foreign political activity seem to 
confirm the hypothesis that countries with faster economic growth are becoming more active in 
their regional foreign policy. Or at least such hypothesis holds true in the case of Turkey. 
Analytical findings 
During the period between 2002 and 2015 Turkish economy has grown considerably and 
together with that military spending have grown as well. As the entire region of the Middle East 
is developing quickly, Turkey has not managed to increase the amount of power project 
capabilities the state has compared to other countries in the region. The general pattern of power 
in the region is quite similar to what it was in the beginning to the century. Notable changes are 
the weakening of Iraq and Syria. 
Turkish military strength is strongly related to the country’s economic power. The share of 
military spending has constantly been around 2%. That means the growth in military 
expenditures stems mainly from the economic growth of the state and a continuing fast economic 
y = 0.6418x + 19.848 
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growth could help Turkey to develop a stronger military than other states in the region.  On the 
other hand, the size of active military personnel is not significantly affected by economic growth 
at all.  
The thesis used Turkish foreign trade with other states of the Middle East as an indicator of 
Turkish soft economic power over those countries. The amount of exports of Turkey into Middle 
East countries has increased rapidly. The share of export Turkey sends to the region increased 
from 9,1% to 27,5%. That means Turkey has made other states of the region a lot more 
dependent on itself economically and due to that achieved a greater level of power and influence. 
Increase of exports into the region is directly fueled by the Turkish economic growth as exports 
to other parts of the world have not decreased. 
Turkish activity in the Middle East region has increased in the recent years. More visits by the 
Turkish officials are conducted to states in the region and an increasingly large number of press 
releases given out by Turkey concern countries of the Middle East. Both of these indicators 
covariate and correlate strongly with Turkish economic growth. During the years after economic 
regression fewer visits are conducted to neighboring states and fewer statements are made about 
states of the Middle East. During economic hardship, the country simply has fewer resources to 
spend for foreign policy and spends more attention to solving domestic issues. 
Out of the countries of the Middle East, states that are more powerful (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran) 
are paid more visits by the Turkish officials meaning that those states that could shape the future 
of the whole region are prioritized by Turkish foreign policy establishment. Likewise Turkey 
mentions those states more than others in their press releases as well. Turkey has stable and 
friendly relations with most of the states of the region. However, it is possible to see Turkey 
adopting more critical and assertive stance towards Syria, Iraq and Egypt in the recent year. That 
likely signifies Turkish attempts to gain greater influence in the region. Notably, both Syria and 
Iraq have lost relative power in the region compared to Turkey and therefor have become easy 
targets for Turkey to assert its’ influence on. 
The hypothesis of this thesis stated that economic growth of regional powers causes them to 
become more active and asserting in regional politics (through enabling them to increase the 
amount of resources they have for foreign policy). This hypothesis is true in the case of Turkey. 
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However, the impact of economic growth on foreign political activity is somewhat lower than 
expected. That stems from the fact that during the same time period other countries in the region 
had a similar level of economic growth and therefore, the balance of power in the region did not 
change much. Turkey shows clear signs in trying to take a more prominent role in the region, but 
they are still very far from getting close to hegemonic position. 
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Conclusions 
The focus of the current thesis was on the relationship between economic growth and foreign 
political activity in the case of regional powers in developing regions. The hypothesis set out to 
be testes was that economic growth allows regional powers to increase the amount of resources 
they have for foreign policy and that enables them to take a more active and assertive role in 
regional politics. To analyze the hypothesis a single case study of Turkey in the Middle East 
region was used.  
Theoretical part of the thesis dealt with conceptualizing regions in international relations. For 
that Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s theory of regional security complexes was used. According 
to that states are bound together in coherent regions based on common security threats and 
interactions. Inside those regions, basic principles of international relations apply. As posited by 
the neorealist theory, countries always try to maximize their power to defend themselves. 
Therefore, regional powers should strive to achieve hegemony in the long term. Economic 
growth simply allows them to gain enough resources to do that. 
The second part of the thesis dealt with explaining the specific conditions of Middle East as a 
region. It was determined to be a multipolar region with Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
being the leading powers with Turkey being the best choice of country to analyze due to being 
both a critical and paradigmatic case.  After that the methodology of the following analysis was 
laid out (single case study that mainly uses quantitative analysis). 
In the analytical section of the thesis it was found out that the balance of power in the Middle 
East has not changed much in the recent years. Turkey used to have the most material 
capabilities in the region in 2002 and still has in the present day. While the economic growth 
helped Turkey to increase its’ capabilities its’ economy did not grow significantly faster than the 
economy of other regional states. Turkish economic growth and increase of its’ military spending 
had a strong correlation.  
Analysis of press releases of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that Turkish officials 
visit more foreign countries and write more about states in the Middle East when Turkish 
economy is growing quickly. Turkish foreign policy was focused on other states in the region 
that were in the competition for a leadership role with Turkey. The relationship between Turkey 
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and most other states did not qualitative change a lot in the last decade. However, Turkey has 
become more critical and assertive towards Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Iraq and Syria are the two 
states that have notably become less powerful compared to Turkey and therefore have been easy 
targets for Turkey to spread their influence on. 
The thesis found that broadly speaking the presented hypothesis is true. The amount of resources 
a state has to use for foreign policy is indeed in positive correlation with the economic growth of 
the state. In addition to that Turkish foreign policy did become more active following periods the 
country experienced a fast economic growth. 
Further analysis could be conducted in the topic that would test if the same hypothesis applies in 
the case of different regions of the world that have other internal power dynamics. A small N 
analysis could give information about how widely the findings of this thesis can be generalized 
on to other regional powers.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: International visits by Turkish state officials 
 
Location Year 
Middle 
East 
Title 
Egypt, Lebanon 2007 Yes 
NO:148 - 15 October 2007, Press Statements 
Regarding;visit of;;Ali Babacan, The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to Egypt and Lebanon on 17-19 October 2007 
(Unofficial Translation)  
Greece 2007  No 
NO:171 -;25 November 2007, Press Release Regarding 
Visit of Ali Babacan, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to 
Greece;(Unofficial Translation)  
Iraq 2007 Yes 
NO:153 - 23 October 2007, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of The Foreign Minister; to Baghdad (Unofficial 
Translation)  
Macedonia 2007  no 
NO:49 - 20 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the visit 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 
Mr. Abdullah Gül to the Republic of Macedonia on 21 
March 2007 (Unofficial Translation)  
North Cyprus 2007  no 
NO:66 -;12 April 2007, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
H.E. Abdullah Gül;to the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus.;(Unofficial Translation)  
Pakistan, 
Afghanistan 
2007  no 
NO:38 - 23 February 2007, Press Release Regarding the 
visit of H.E. Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey, to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan;(Unofficial Translation)  
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 2007 yes 
NO:149 - 19 October 2007, Press Statement Regaring the 
visit of Ali Babacan,The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on 21-22 September 2007 
(Unofficial Translation)  
Czech Republic 2008  no 
No:188 - 3 November 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ali Babacan to the Czech Republic (Unofficial 
Translation)  
Estonia 2008  no 
NO:105 - 12 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan 
to the Republic of Estonia (Unofficial Translation)  
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Finland 2008  no 
NO:70-9 May 2008, Offical Visit of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ali Babacan to Finland (Unofficial Translation)  
India 2008  no 
NO:13 - 4 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding 
Offical Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ali 
Babacan India (Unofficial Translation)  
Lebanon 2008 yes 
NO:87- 23 May 2008, The Offical Visit of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Lebanon 
(Unofficial Translation)  
Malaysia 2008  No 
NO:120 - 4 July 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali 
Babacan To Malaysia for D-8 Summit 
Oman 2008 yes 
NO-58 25 April 2008 Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali 
Babacan To Oman (Unofficial Translation)  
Pakistan 2008  no 
NO:55 - 17 April 2008, Press Relase Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan 
(Unofficial Translation)  
Poland 2008  No 
No:196 - 17 November 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan's 
Official Visit to Poland (Unofficial Translation)  
Russia 2008  no 
NO:24 - 18 February 2008, Press Statement Regarding 
visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ali Babacan to the 
Russian Federation (Unofficial Translation)  
Switzerland 2008  no 
No:167 - 9 September 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Working Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali 
BABACAN To Switzerland (Unofficial Translation)  
Uganda 2008  no 
NO:108 - 17 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan 
to Uganda for the 35th Session of the Islamic Conference 
of Foreign Ministers (Unofficial Translation)  
Ukraine 2008  no 
NO:17 - 12 February 2008, Press Release Regarding visit 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan to Ukraine 
(Unofficial Translation)  
Ukraine 2008  no 
NO:54 - 16 April 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan 
to Ukraine (Unofficial Translation)  
United Kingdom 2008  no 
NO:51 - 12 April 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan 
to United Kingdom (Unofficial Translation)  
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United Kingdom 2008  no 
NO: 63 - 1 May 2008, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Babacan to UK (Unofficial Translation)  
USA 2008  no 
NO:97 - 2 June 2008, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan 
to the United States  
Afghanistan 2009  no 
No: 213, 18 November 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Afghanistan  
Austria 2009  no 
No:49 - 14 April 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ali Babacan to Austria  
Belgium, Azerbaijan 2009  no 
No: 169, 1 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Brussels and Nakhchivan  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Albania 
2009  no 
No: 187, 15 October 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania  
Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2009  no 
No: 233, 11 December 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Kosovo 2009  no 
No:7 - 12 January 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ali Babacan to the Republic of Kosova  
Phillipines 2009  No 
No:35 - 16 March 2009, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the 
Philippines 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
2009  no 
No:128, 21 July 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Serbia and Montenegro  
Slovenia 2009  no 
No: 149, 27 August 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Slovenia  
Yemen, Bahrain, 
Lithuania 
2009 yes 
No:28 - 16 February 2009, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Foreign Minister Ali Babacan to Yemen, 
Bahrain and Lithuania  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2010  no 
No: 235, 19 October 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Bosnia and Herzegovina  
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Bulgaria 2010  no 
No: 62, 17 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Bulgaria  
Finland 2010  no 
No: 57, 11 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Finland  
Greece 2010  no 
No: 172, 6 August 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Rhodes  
Ireland 2010  no 
No: 51, 5 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Ireland  
Italy 2010  no 
No: 245, 5 November 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Italy 
Macedonia 2010  no 
No: 66, 24 March 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Macedonia  
Norway 2010  no 
No: 128, 11 June 2010, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Norway 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2011  no 
No: 35, 28 January 2011, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Greece 2011  no 
No: 62, 04 March 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to 
Greece  
Hungary 2011  no 
No:99, 10 April 2011, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Hungary 
Italy 2011  no 
No:142, 1June 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit of 
H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
Italy 
Nepal 2011  no 
No: 47, 14 February 2011, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Nepal  
Saudi Arabia 2011 yes 
No: 163, 9 July 2011, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to 
Saudi Arabia  
68 
 
Tunisia 2011 Yes 
No: 50, 17 February 2011, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of His Excellency Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to Tunisia 
as the Chairperson of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe  
Austria 2012  no 
No: 84, 21 Mart 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Austria  
Azerbaijan 2012  no 
No: 237, 13 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Azerbaijan on 15-16 
October 2012 on the occasion of the 12th ECO Summit 
Meeting 
Belgium 2012  no 
No: 250, 6 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Brussels  
Belgium 2012  no 
No: 85, 21 March 2012, Press Release Regarding The 
Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkey, to Brussels For Meetings With The EU  
Belgium 2012  no 
No: 14, 17 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Belgium on the 
Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of Turkey’s 
Membership to NATO  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2012  no 
No: 123, 02 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 
Canada 2012  no 
No: 220, 18 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu , Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Canada  
Estonia 2012  no 
No: 128, 9 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Estonia  
Finland 2012  no 
No: 291, 18 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Finland  
France 2012  No 
No: 176, 4 July 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey to France  
Greece 2012  no 
No : 231, 9 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Greece  
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Iran 2012 yes 
No: 2, 3 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey H.E. Mr. Davutoğlu to Iran  
Italy 2012  no 
No: 255, 10 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Italy 
on the of occasion of the 9th Turkish-Italian Forum  
Kosovo 2012  no 
No: 210, 7 September 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit to Kosovo of H.E. Mr. Mehmet Şimşek, Minister of 
Finance of the Republic of Turkey 
Lebanon 2012 yes 
No: 11, 13 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of the 
Republic of Turkey, to Lebanon  
Macedonia 2012  no 
No: 293, 19 December 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Macedonia  
Moldova 2012  no 
No: 132, 11 May 2012, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
to Moldova of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 
Myanmar 2012  no 
No: 197, 8 August 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Myanmar  
Netherlands 2012  No 
No: 71, 05 March 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey to the Netherlands  
Russia 2012  No 
No: 22, 23 January 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Moscow  
Saudi Arabia 2012 Yes 
No: 266, 22 November 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Chief of the General Staff Mr. Necdet Özel to 
Saudi Arabia  
USA 2012  No 
No: 39, 8 Februrary 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to the United States of 
America  
Yemen 2012 Yes 
No: 240, 19 October 2012, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu , Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Yemen  
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Armenia 2013  No 
No: 327, 11 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Yerevan on 12 
December 2013 on the Occasion of the 29th Meeting of 
the Council of Ministers of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC)  
Azerbaijan 2013  No 
No: 203, 16 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Minister’s Visit to Azerbaijan  
Azerbaijan 2013  No 
No: 166, 11 June 2013, Press Release Regarding Minister 
Davutoğlu’s Visit to Azerbaijan to Participate in OIC 
Meetings on Palestine  
Belarus 2013  No 
No: 87, 28 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Belarus  
Belgium 2013  No 
No: 13, 21 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Brussels on the 
Occasion of the Trilateral Ministerial Meeting between 
Turkey and Belgium  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2013  No 
No: 129, 7 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 
the Occasion of the Trilateral Consultation Meeting of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia  
Brunei, Singapore 2013  No 
No: 186, 29 June 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Brunei and Singapore  
Croatia, Montenegro, 
Albania 
2013  No 
No: 262, 2 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu to Croatia, 
Montenegro and Albania  
Georgia 2013  No 
No: 85, 26 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to Georgia and the 
Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia  
Germany 2013  No 
No: 135, 9 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Germany 
Germany, France 2013  No 
No: 65, 12 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
to Germany and France of H.E. Ambassador Feridun 
Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 
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Germany, UK, Italy 2013  No 
No: 229, 20 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Italy 
Greece 2013  No 
No: 328, 11 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Greece  
Iran 2013 Yes 
No: 312, 25 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Tehran to Participate 
in the 21st Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and for 
Bilateral Contacts with Iranian Officials  
Iran 2013 Yes 
No: 217, 3 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Iran  
Iraq 2013 Yes 
No: 294, 9 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iraq  
Jordan 2013 Yes 
No: 136, 10 May 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Jordan  
Kazakhstan 2013  No 
No: 122, 25 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Kazakhstan  
Myanmar 2013  No 
No: 296, 13 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Myanmar  
North Cyprus 2013  No 
No: 331, 13 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu to the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus  
Oman, Kuwait 2013 Yes 
No: 281, 22 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu to the Sultanate of 
Oman and Kuwait  
Pakistan 2013  No 
No: 333, 17 December 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Islamabad on the 
Occasion of the 16th Ministerial Council Meeting of the 
Developing 8 Countries (D-8) and Bilateral Contacts To 
Be Held with the Pakistani Officials  
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Palestine 2013 Yes 
No: 121, 25 April 2013, Press Release Concerning the 
Prime Minister’s Visit to Gaza  
Poland 2013  No 
No: 206, 22 July 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey to Poland  
Poland 2013  No 
No: 78, 21 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Poland  
Qatar, Bahrain 2013 Yes 
No: 309, 22 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H. E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Qatar and Bahrain  
Russia 2013  No 
No: 55, 5 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
to Moscow of H.E. Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioğlu, 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Turkey 
Russia 2013  No 
No: 4, 11 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to 
Moscow 
Russia 2013  No 
No: 3, 8 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to 
Moscow 
Saudi Arabia 2013 Yes 
No: 234, 27 August 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Saudi Arabia  
Serbia 2013  No 
No: 24, 31 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Serbia  
Slovakia, Hungary 2013  No 
No: 287, 29 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Slovakia and 
Hungary 
Somalia, Sudan 2013  No 
No: 44, 21 February 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visits of H.E. Mr. Bekir Bozdağ, Deputy Prime Minister 
and H.E. Mr. Cevdet Yılmaz, Minister of Development to 
Somalia and Sudan  
Switzerland 2013  No 
No: 270, 8 October 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu to 
Switzerland.  
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Syria 2013 Yes 
No: 158, 29 May 2013, Press Release regarding the visits 
paid by delegations of the main opposition party CHP to 
Syria.  
UK 2013  No 
No: 58, 6 March 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to the United Kingdom  
USA 2013  No 
No: 299, 15 November 2013, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United 
States 
USA 2013  No 
No: 6, 12 January 2013, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to 
the USA 
Belgium 2014  No 
No: 40, 9 February 2014, Press Release Regarding 
Minister Davutoğlu’s visit to Brussels  
Bosnia Herzegovina 2014  No 
No: 46, 11 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
Brazil 2014  No 
No: 406, 26 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Brazil to attend the 
inauguration ceremony of H.E. President Dilma Rousseff  
Bulgaria 2014  No 
No: 65, 27 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Bulgaria  
France 2014  No 
No: 315, 09 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
France  
France 2014  No 
No: 249, 24 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to France  
Germany 2014  No 
No: 297, 17 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Germany  
Greece 2014  No 
No: 386, 10 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
Thessaloniki on 12 December 2014, on the Occasion of 
the 31st Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC)  
Iran 2014 Yes 
No: 388, 11 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Tehran  
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Iraq 2014 Yes 
No: 397, 18 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to 
Baghdad within the scope of the Second Meeting of the 
Turkey-Iraq High Level Strategic Council (HLSC)  
Iraq 2014 Yes 
No: 339, 04 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Iraq  
Jordan, Bahrain, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
2014 Yes 
No: 287, 8 September 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 
Kosovo 2014  No 
No: 133, 30 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Naci Koru, Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Kosovo  
Libya 2014 Yes 
No: 337, 03 November 2011, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Special Representative Mr. Emrullah İşler to 
Libya  
Libya 2014 Yes 
No: 325, 20 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Special Representative Mr. Emrullah İşler to 
Libya  
Mexico 2014  No 
No: 117, 12 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mexico to Attend the 
İnformal Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the “MIKTA” 
Initiative  
New Zealand 2014  No 
No: 349, 10 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to New Zealand  
North Cyprus 2014  No 
No: 149, 16 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to TRNC  
Russia 2014  No 
No: 400, 22 December 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Moscow  
Saudi Arabia 2014 Yes 
No: 341, 05 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Saudi Arabia  
Serbia 2014  No 
No: 193, 9 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Serbia  
Tanzania 2014  No 
No: 176, 29 May 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Tanzania  
75 
 
Tunesia 2014 Yes 
No: 322, 17 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia  
Tunisia 2014 Yes 
No: 42, 10 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Minister Foreign Affairs' Visit to Tunisia 
Ukraine 2014  No 
No: 346, 07 November 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E.Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
Ukraine  
Ukraine 2014  No 
No: 70, 28 February 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Working Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, to Ukraine  
USA 2014  No 
No: 318, 10 October 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
New York for the United Nations Security Council 
Elections for non-permanent seats for the term 2015-2016 
USA 2014  No 
No:245, 20 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Working Visit of the H.E. Mr. Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu, 
Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Turkey, to the United States  
USA 2014  No 
No: 195, 10 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to New York within the 
Framework of the Fourth Review Meeting of the UN 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
USA 2014  No 
No: 189, 7 June 2014, Press Release Regarding the 
Working Visit of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the United States 
USA 2014  No 
No: 101, 2 April 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey to New York  
USA 2014  No 
No: 78, 8 March 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey to New York and Participation 
in the Summit of CARICOM  
Uzbekistan 2014  No 
No: 233, 8 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
by H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Uzbekistan  
Zambia 2014  No 
No: 230, 7 July 2014, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Zambia  
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Austria 2015  No 
No: 279, 20 October 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Feridun H.Sinirlioğlu to 
Austria on the Occasion of the Commemoration 
Ceremony to be Held in the Memory of the Fallen Turkish 
Diplomats  
Azerbaijan 2015  No 
No: 296, 26 November 2015, Press Release regarding the 
visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Azerbaijan  
Azerbaijan 2015  No 
No: 251, 11 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Feridun 
H.Sinirlioğlu to Azerbaijan  
Azerbaijan 2015  No 
No: 65, 19 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Azerbaijan  
Belgium 2015  No 
No: 307, 13 December 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
Brussels  
Bosnia and 
Herzgovina 
2015  No 
No: 137, 29 April 2015, Press Release regarding the visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Cambodia, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
2015  No 
No: 84, 13 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey to Cambodia, Thailand and 
Vietnam 
Croatia 2015  No 
No: 198, 8 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey, to Croatia  
Germany 2015  No 
No: 49, 05 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to Germany 
Kuwait 2015 Yes 
No: 19, 15 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Kuwait  
Kyrgyztan 2015  No 
No: 209, 20 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Working Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu to the Kyrgyz Republic on 22-24 July 2015 
Kyrgyztan 2015  No 
No: 107, 9 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Foreign Minister H.E Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Latin America 2015  No 
No: 52, 06 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E.Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to Latin America In 
Company of H.E. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
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Lithuania 2015  No 
No: 96, 31 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Lithuania  
Malta 2015  No 
No: 81, 07 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E.Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey, to Malta 
Moldova 2015  No 
No: 95, 31 March 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey to Moldova  
Mongolia 2015  No 
No: 106, 9 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 
to Mongolia  
Northen Cyprus 2015  No 
No: 294, 25 November 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus  
Northen Cyprus 2015  No 
No: 163, 25 May 2015, Press Release regarding the visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus  
Northen Cyprus 2015  No 
No: 12, 12 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus  
Portugal 2015  No 
No: 213, 24 July 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Portugal on 
the occasion of Revealing the “Fallen Diplomats 
Monument” in the compound of the Turkish Embassy in 
Lisbon  
Qatar 2015 Yes 
No: 20, 16 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Qatar  
Romania 2015  No 
No: 172, 8 June 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey, to Romania  
Russia 2015  No 
No: 253, 15 September 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Working Visits of Foreign Minister H.E. Feridun H. 
Sinirlioğlu to the Russian Federation  
South Korea 2015  No 
No: 159, 18 May 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Turkey, to the Republic of Korea to 
Participate in the Fifth MIKTA Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting 
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Turkmenistan 2015  No 
No: 25, 22 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 
to Turkmenistan and the Trilateral Meeting of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan 
USA 2015  No 
No: 118, 16 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Visit 
of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the USA  
USA 2015  No 
No: 67, 19 February 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the United States  
Yemen 2015 Yes 
No: 21, 16 January 2015, Press Release Regarding the 
Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
Yemen  
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Annex 2: Press releases about countries in the Middle East 
 
Year Country 1 Tone 
Country 
2 Tone Title 
2007 Algeria neutral     
NO:126 -;7 September 2007, Press Release 
Regarding the Assassination Attempt Against 
President of Algeria HE Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Algeria positive     
NO:68 -;12 April 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the Condemning;Terror Attack;in Algeria 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Egypt neutral Lebanon neutral 
NO:148 - 15 October 2007, Press Statements 
Regarding;visit of;;Ali Babacan, The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to Egypt and Lebanon on 17-19 
October 2007 (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iran neutral     
NO:56 - 30 March 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the 15 British sailors, who were taken into 
custody by Iran in the Persian Gulf on the 
grounds that they had violated the Iranian 
territorial waters.; (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iran neutral     
NO:159 -;1 November 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding the visit of H.E. Manouchehr Mottaki, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, to Ankara (Unofficial 
Translation) 
2007 Iran positive     
NO:61 - 5 April 2007, Press Release 
Regarding;the decision to release 15 British 
naval personnel, who were taken into custody by 
Iran in the Persian Gulf. (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
A:22 - 15 March 2007,;Announcement Regarding 
the Fifth Donor Committee meeting of the 
International Reconstruction Fund Facility for 
Iraq (IRFFI);in Istanbul on 20th March 2007. 
(Unofficial translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:43 - 7 March 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the Heinous Terrorist Attack in Hillah,Iraq 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:54 - 29 March 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the;Bomb Attacks;Targeted Innocent Civilians in 
Telafer City in Iraq (Unofficial Translation) 
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2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:91 -;14 June 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the Destruction of Askariya Mosque in Iraq by a 
Terrorist Attack (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:97 27 June 2007, Press Statement Regarding 
the decision taken during the Enlarged 
Ministerial Conference of the Neighboring 
Countries of Iraq Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:104 - 13 July 2007, Press Release Regaring 
the Injured Iraqi Turkomans Brought to Turkey 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:115 - 14 August 2007, Press Release 
Regarding the Humanitarian Aid to Iraq 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:116 - 15 August 2007, Press Release 
Regarding the Suicide Attacks in Iraq;(Unofficial 
Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:131 -;12 September 2007, Press release 
Regarding Certain Expressions Used by Mr. 
Hoshyar Zebari, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Iraq (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Iraq neutral     
NO:143 - 9 October 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding the cholera outbreak in Northern 
Iraq(Unofficial translation) 
2007 Iraq positive     
NO:77 - 18 May 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq.;(Unofficial 
Translation) 
2007 Iraq positive     
NO:122 -;29 August 2007, Press Release 
Regarding the Communiqué Released Jointly by 
the Iraqi Leaders;(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Israel neutral     
NO:164 -;8 November 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding the visit of President of the State of 
Israel Shimon Peres to Turkey;(Unofficial 
Translation) 
2007 Lebanon positive     
NO:178 -;12 December 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding Brigadier Francois Hajj, Chief of 
Operations Department of the Lebanese 
Army(Unofficial Translation)  
2007 Palestine negative     
NO:75 - 16 May 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the Ongoing Infighting Between the Palestinian 
Factions. (Unofficial Translation) 
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2007 Palestine neutral Israel negative 
No:81 - 24 May 2007, Press;Statement Regarding 
the Arrests of; High Level Palestinian 
Officials;During Israeli Operations (Unofficial 
Translation) 
2007 Palestine neutral     
NO:144 - 8October 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding the emergency humanitarian 
assistance needed for the Palestinian refugees.  
2007 Palestine neutral     
NO:163 -;8 November 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding the Visit of ;President of the 
Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas 
to Turkey (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Palestine positive     
NO:47 -;17 March 2007, Press Release Regarding 
the Newly Established National Unity 
Government in Palestine (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Palestine positive     
NO:179 -;13 December 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding Palestine Donors Conference in Paris 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Saudi Arabia neutral Kuwait neutral 
NO:149 - 19 October 2007, Press Statement 
Regaring the visit of Ali Babacan,The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on 
21-22 September 2007 (Unofficial Translation) 
2007 Saudi Arabia neutral     
NO:162 -;7 November 2007, Press Statement 
Regarding the Visit of The King of Saudi Arabia to 
Turkey (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Algeria positive     
NO:155 - 20 August 2008, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Algeria 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Iran neutral     
NO:127 - 16 July 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Manouchehr Mottaki 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Iraq neutral     
NO:8 - 25 January 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the bombing attacks that took place on January 
23 and January 24 in the city of Mosul of 
Iraq.(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Iraq neutral     
No:179 - 4 October 2008, The attack by the PKK 
near the Turkish-Iraqi border has caused great 
outrage (Unofficial Tarnslation) 
2008 Iraq positive     
NO:133 - 28 July 2008, Terror Attack in the Iraqi 
City of Kirkuk on 28 July. 
2008 Iraq positive     
NO:143 - 9 August 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Suicide Bomb Attack in Iraq  
82 
 
2008 Israel negative     
NO:7 - 21 January 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Embargo Imposed by Israel on the Gaza 
Strip(Unofficial Translation)  
2008 Israel negative     
NO:33 - 29 February 2008, Press Statement 
Regarding the Attacks From Israel (Unofficial 
Translation) 
2008 Israel negative     
NO:40 - 12 March 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Declarations of Israeli authorities to build 
750 Housing Units in Givat Zeev Settlement 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Israel negative     
No:197 - 18 November 2008, Press Release 
Regarding the Rocket and Mortar Attacks from 
the Gaza Strip to Israel (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Israel neutral     
NO:12 - 4 February 2008, Press Statement 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Israel. 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Israel neutral     
NO:38 - 7 March 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack in Israel (Unofficial 
Translation) 
2008 Israel positive     
No:109 - 19 June 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Ceasefire Between Israel and Hamas 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Jordan positive     
NO:25 - 19 February 2008, Press Statement 
Regarding the visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Salahaddin 
Bashir to Turkey (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon neutral     
NO:87- 23 May 2008, The Offical Visit of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey to Lebanon (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon neutral     
NO:83 - 21 May 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Agreement Among the Lebanese Groups 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon neutral     
NO:73 -14 May 2008, Press Release Regarding 
Lebanon (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon neutral     
NO:71 - 9 May 2008, Press Release Regarding 
Lebanon (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon neutral     
NO:149 - 15 August 2008, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of the His Excellency Mr. 
Michel Suleiman, the President of Lebanon, to 
Damascus 
2008 Lebanon neutral     
NO:146 - 13 August 2008, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Targeted a Bus in 
Lebanon 
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2008 Lebanon neutral     
No:169 - 12 September 2008, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Lebanon 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon positive     
NO:95 - 29 May 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the New Government in Lebanon 
2008 Lebanon positive     
NO:89 - 26 May 2008,the Election of Mr. Michel 
Suleiman as the President of the Republic of 
Lebanon (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Lebanon positive     
No:124 - 11 July 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Establishment of the National Unity 
Government Among the Lebanese Groups in 
Doha. 
2008 Oman neutral     
NO-58 25 April 2008 Press Release Regarding the 
Official Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali 
Babacan To Oman (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Syria neutral Israel neutral 
NO-81 - 21 May 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Indirect Peace Talks between Syria and Israel 
under the auspices of Turkey (Unofficial 
Translation) 
2008 Syria neutral Israel neutral 
No:106 - 16 June 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under 
the Auspices of Turkey (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Syria neutral Israel neutral 
NO:136 - 30 July 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Fourth Round of the Indirect Peace Talks 
Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of 
Turkey 
2008 Syria neutral Israel neutral 
NO:119 - 3 July 2008, Press Release Regarding 
the Third Round of the Indirect Peace Talks 
Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of 
Turkey (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Syria positive Lebanon positive 
No:182 - 16 October 2008, Press Release 
Regarding the Joint Statement Between Syria 
and Lebanon (Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Tunisia neutral     
NO:85 - 23 May 2008, Press Release regarding 
the Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Tunisia, H.E. Abdulwaheb Abdallah, to Turkey 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2008 Tunisia positive     
BN:6 - 4 April 2008, Information Note Regarding 
a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation between the Foreign Ministry 
Training Centers of Turkey and Israel 
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2008 UAE neutral     
NO: 64 - 2 May 2008, Press Relase Regarding the 
Official Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
United Arab Emirates Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed 
(Unofficial Translation) 
2009 Iran neutral     
No: 191, 18 October 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in İran 
2009 Iran positive     
No:124, 15 July 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Plain Crash in Iran 
2009 Iran positive     
No:82, 29 May 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in the 
Iranian City of Zahidan 
2009 Iraq neutral     
No:57, 24 April 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Terrorist Attacks in Iraq  
2009 Iraq neutral     
No:26 - 14 February 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Iraq 
2009 Iraq neutral     
No:12 - 22 January 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Official Visit of H.E. Mr. Hoshyar 
Zebari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq 
2009 Iraq neutral     
No:5 - 5 January 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Suicide Attack in Iraq 
2009 Iraq positive     
No:15 - 29 January 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Provincial Elections in Iraq 
2009 Iraq positive     
No:13 - 22 January 2009, Press Release 
Regarding Iraq becoming the 186th State Party 
to the Convention of Chemical Weapons 
2009 Israel negative     
No: 242, 29 December 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Israel’s Announcement that New 
Settlement Units will be Constructed in East 
Jerusalem 
2009 Israel negative     
No:133, 3 August 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Eviction By the Israeli Police of Palestinian 
Families From Their Homes in the Sheikh Jarrah 
District of East Jerusalem 
2009 Israel negative     
No:3 - 4 January 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Ground Operation by Israel to the Gaza Strip 
2009 Jordan neutral     
No: 138, 18 August 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Working Visit of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan H.E. Nasser Judeh to Turkey 
2009 Lebanon positive     
No:93, 08 June 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Elections Held in Lebanon 
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2009 Palestine neutral     
No:23 - 10 February 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the "International Conference to 
Support the Palestinian Economy for the 
Reconstruction of Gaza" in Cairo 
2009 Yemen neutral Bahrain neutral 
No:28 - 16 February 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of the Foreign Minister Ali 
Babacan to Yemen, Bahrain and Lithuania 
2009 Yemen positive     
No: 166, 23 September 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Actions of Violence in Yemen 
2009 Yemen positive     
No: 156, 5 September 2009, Press Release 
Regarding the Turkey’s Humanitarian Assistance 
to the World Food Programme for Yemen 
2009 Yemen positive     
No:97, 18 June 2009, Press Release Regarding 
the Situation in Yemen 
2010 Iran neutral     
No: 281, 15 December 2010, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Iran 
2010 Iran neutral     
No: 165, 25 July 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Meeting between Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim 
and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr 
Mottaki 
2010 Iran neutral     
No: 161, 16 July 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Suicide Attack in Zahedan, Iran 
2010 Iran neutral     
No: 109, 24 May 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Letter Submitted by Iran to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with 
the Joint Declaration 
2010 Iran positive     
No: 125, 9 June 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the UN Security Council Vote on Additional 
Sanctions against Iran 
2010 Iran positive     
No: 101, 17 May 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Programme 
2010 Iraq positive     
No: 290, 21 December 2010, Press Release 
Regarding the Establishment of the New Iraqi 
Government 
2010 Iraq positive     
No: 68, 27 March 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Parliamentary Elections in Iraq 
2010 Iraq positive     
No: 50, 5 March 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Parliamentary Elections To Be Held in Iraq 
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2010 Israel negative     
No: 288, 21 December 2010, Press Release 
Regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Greek 
Cypriot Administration and Israel 
2010 Israel negative     
No: 134, 16 June 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Israeli Raid Against the Freedom Flotilla 
2010 Israel negative     
No: 132, 14 June 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Investigation Commission of Israeli Raid 
Against the Freedom Flotilla  
2010 Israel negative     
No: 115, 31 May 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Use of Force by the Israeli Defense Forces 
Against the Humanitarian Aid Flotilla to Gaza  
2010 Israel negative     
No: 56, 11 March 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Israel’s Decision to Build 1600 New Housing 
Units in East Jerusalem 
2010 Israel negative     
No: 7, 12 January 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Attitude of Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister 
During His Meeting With Turkey's Ambassador 
To Tel Aviv 
2010 Israel negative     
No: 6, 12 January 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Statement of the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
2010 Israel neutral     
No: 263, 3 December 2010, Press Release 
Regarding the Forest Fires in Israel 
2010 Israel positive Palestine positive 
No: 198, 1 September 2010, Press Release 
Regarding the Commencement of Direct Talks 
Between Israel and the Palestinians 
2010 Israel positive Palestine positive 
No: 55, 10 March 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Talks Between Israel and Palestine 
2010 Palestine positive     
No: 65, 22 March 2010, Press Release Regarding 
the Attacks from Jewish Settlements on the 
Palestinian Villages in the West Bank 
2011 Bahrain positive     
No:157, July 2 2011, Press Release Regarding The 
Reforms Envisaged to be Realized in Bahrain 
2011 Egypt positive     
No:138, 29 May 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the Decision of the Egyptian Administration to 
Permanently Open the Rafah Crossing 
2011 Iran neutral     
No: 28, 22 January 2011, Press Release 
Regarding the Meeting Between P5+1 and Iran in 
Istanbul on 21-22 January 2011 
2011 Iraq neutral     
No: 86, 30 March 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Against the Provincial Council in Tikrit 
(Iraq) 
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2011 Israel negative     
No: 29, 23 January 2011, Press Statement by the 
National Inquiry and Investigation Commission 
Instituted Upon Israel's Attack on the 
International Humanitarian Aid Convoy 
2011 Israel negative     
No: 8, 11 January 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the the Demolition by Israel of the Shepherd 
Hotel in East Jerusalem 
2011 Lebanon positive     
No: 160, 8 July 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the New Government Formed in Lebanon 
2011 Libya neutral     
No:166, 13 July 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the 4th meeting of the Libya Contact Group 
2011 Libya positive     
No: 77, 19 March 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the Developments in Libya 
2011 Libya positive UAE positive 
No: 69, 12 March 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the Turkey-UAE Joint Humanitarian Assistance 
Operation for Libya 
2011 Morocco positive     
No: 159, 8 July 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the adoption of a new constitution in Morocco 
2011 Palestine neutral     
No:168, 20 July 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the "Palestinian Ambassadors’ Conference" to be 
held in Istanbul on 23-24 July 2011 
2011 Saudi Arabia neutral     
No: 163, 9 July 2011, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. 
Ahmet Davutoğlu to Saudi Arabia  
2011 Tunisia neutral     
No: 50, 17 February 2011, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of His Excellency Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to Tunisia as the Chairperson of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe  
2012 Bahrain neutral     
No: 110, 19 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated Against A 
Police Vehicle in Bahrain 
2012 Egypt neutral     
No: 124, 02 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Developments in Egypt 
2012 Egypt positive     
No: 294, 24 December 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Constitutional Referendum Held 
in Egypt 
2012 Egypt positive     
No: 194, 4 August 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Establishment of the New Government in 
Egypt 
2012 Egypt positive     
No. 174, 24 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Results of the Presidential Elections in Egypt 
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2012 Egypt positive     
No: 170, 16 June 2012,Press Release Regarding 
the developments in Egypt 
2012 Egypt positive     
No. 25, 24 January 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Elections for the People’s 
Assembly Held in Egypt 
2012 Iran negative     
No: 196, 7 August 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Declarations Made by Iranian Officials 
2012 Iran neutral     
No: 273, 27 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Postponement of the Third 
Meetting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran 
2012 Iran neutral     
No: 2, 3 January 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Turkey H.E. Mr. Davutoğlu to Iran  
2012 Iran positive     
No: 270, 26 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding The Third Meetting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran 
2012 Iran positive     
No: 73, 05 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran 
2012 Iraq neutral     
No: 219, 14 September 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Meeting of H.E. Ambassador 
Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, with the 
Ambassador of Iraq in Ankara 
2012 Iraq neutral     
No: 13, 14 January 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attack Targetting Shiite 
Pilgrims Perpetrated in the Iraqi City of Basra 
2012 Iraq neutral     
No: 6, 6 January 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 290, 17 December 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 277, 30 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 251, 6 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in 
Iraq on 6 November 2012 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 211, 10 September 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 191, 23 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
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2012 Iraq positive     
No: 166, 13 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 153, 4 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Suicide Attack Perpetrated Against the Shiite 
Endowment in Baghdad, Capital of Iraq. 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 111, 20 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
The Bomb Attacks Perpetrated In Different Cities 
Of Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 83, 20 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 75, 08 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Iraq (Tal Afar) 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 72, 05 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Iraq 
2012 Iraq positive     
No: 30, 28 January 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attack Perpetrated in Iraq 
on 27January 2012 
2012 Israel negative Palestine positive 
No: 292, 19 December 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Illegal Settlement Activities of 
Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 279, 2 December 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Illegal Settlement Activities of 
Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative     
No: 261, 14 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Gaza Operation Launched by Israel 
Today 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 252, 8 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Settlement Activities of Israel in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 242, 20 October 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Settlement Activities of Israel in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative     
No: 235, 10 October 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Attacks Perpetrated by Israeli 
Extremists Against Sacred Sites 
2012 Israel negative     
No: 218, 14 September 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Upgrading the Status of an 
Educational Institution in the West Bank into a 
University Status 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 206, 27 August 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Israeli Illegal Settlement Activities 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
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2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 181, 05 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Israeli Illegal Settlement Activities in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative     
No: 161, 08 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Israeli Settlement in the West Bank 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 125, 3 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Israeli Illegal Settlement Activities in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 118, 25 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Israeli Settlement Activities in the Palestinian 
Territories 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 100, 06 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Israeli Settlement Activities in the Palestinian 
Territories 
2012 Israel negative     
No: 87, 22 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Israel’s Plans for the Settlements in West Bank 
2012 Israel negative     
No: 76, 10 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Israel’s Attacks Targeting Gaza  
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 55, 24 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Israeli Settlements in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories 
2012 Israel negative Palestine neutral 
No: 5, 6 January 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Israeli Settlement Activities in the Palestinian 
Territories 
2012 Israel neutral Palestine neutral 
No: 264, 21 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Ceasefire Agreement between 
Israel and Palestine 
2012 Israel neutral     
No: 42, 14 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Attacks Against Israeli Missions 
2012 Lebanon neutral Syria neutral 
No: 205, 25 August 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Release of One of the Lebanese 
Citizens Kidnapped in Syria 
2012 Lebanon neutral     
No: 11, 13 January 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Lebanon 
2012 Lebanon positive     
No: 241, 19 October 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Which Took Place 
in Lebanon 
2012 Libya positive     
No: 248, 1 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Taking Office of the New 
Government in Libya 
91 
 
2012 Libya positive     
No: 182, 08 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
National Congress Elections in Libya 
2012 Morroco neutral     
No: 80, 16 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of H.E. Mr. Saad-Eddine El Othmani, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of 
Morocco to Turkey 
2012 Palestine neutral Israel negative 
No: 21, 23 January 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Arrest of Mr. Aziz Dweik, Head of 
The Palestinian Legislative Council and Another 
Palestinian Parliamentarian by Israel 
2012 Palestine positive     
No: 253, 8 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Riad Al-Malki, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Palestine, to Turkey 
2012 Saudi Arabia neutral     
No: 278, 2 December 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Killing of an Assistant Military 
Attaché at the Saudi Embassy in Sana'a 
2012 Saudi Arabia neutral     
No: 266, 22 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of the Chief of the General 
Staff Mr. Necdet Özel to Saudi Arabia 
2012 Saudi Arabia positive Iraq positive 
No: 243, 26 October 2012, Press Release 
Regarding Our Citizens who went to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in transit through the 
Republic of Iraq 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 256, 12 November 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Syrian Opposition Forming a New 
Structure 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 195, 4 August 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Resolution on Syria Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 190, 19 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the UN Security Council Being Unable to Pass a 
Resolutıon once again on Syria 
2012 Syria negative     
No:186, 13 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Massacre Perpetrated Against the People of 
Tremseh Village in Hama by the Syrian Regime 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 185, 11 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Syria 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 173, 24 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Steps Taken by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in Respect of 
the Shooting Down of a Turkish Military Aircraft 
Off the Coast of Syria 
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2012 Syria negative     
No: 160, 07 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Increase in the Acts of Violence against the 
Civilian Population in Syria 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 152, 02 June 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on 
Syria 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 151, 30 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
All Diplomatic Members of the Syrian Embassy in 
Ankara Being Asked to Leave the Country 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 147, 26 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Attacks Perpetrated by the Syrian 
Administration Against Civilians  
2012 Syria negative     
No: 129, 09 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Bomb Attack Carried Out Against the Convoy 
of UN Supervision Mission (UNSMIS) in Syria 
Today (9 May) 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 113, 21 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
The Resolution on Syria Adopted by The United 
Nations Security Council 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 104, 14 April 2012, Press Releaese Regarding 
the Resolution on Syria Adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 102, 10 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
Syrian Regime’s Failure to Fulfill Its Pledge in 
Accordance with Annan’s Plan 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 101, 09 April 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Opening of Fire to the Refuge Camps from 
the Syrian Side of the Border  
2012 Syria negative     
No: 69, 01 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the UN Human Rights Council Resolution on 
Syria 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 48, 18 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Resolution on the Situation in 
Syria Adopted by the UN General Assembly 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 38, 4 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the UN Security Council Being Unable 
to reach a Decision on Syria  
2012 Syria negative     
No:37, 4 February 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Attacks Perpetrated by the Syrian 
Administration Against the People of Homs 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 33, 1 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Escalation of Violence in Syria 
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2012 Syria negative     
No:28, 27 January 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Perpetrated Against Mr. Abd-al-
Razzaq Jbeiro, Secretary-General of the Syrian 
Arab Red Crescent 
2012 Syria negative     
No: 26, 24 January 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Decision taken by the Arab League 
about Syria on 22 January 
2012 Syria neutral     
No: 202, 19 August 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Appointment of Mr. Lakhdar 
Brahimi as the Joint Special Representative of 
the UN and the League of Arab States for Syria 
2012 Syria neutral     
No: 133, 12 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Turkish Journalists Missing in Syria 
2012 Syria neutral     
No: 57, 24 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Appointment of Former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the Joint Special 
Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States 
on the Syrian Crisis 
2012 Tunisia neutral     
No: 7, 9 January 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Tunisia to Turkey 
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 285, 11 December 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Murder of Chief Commander of 
Central Army Force of Yemen  
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 240, 19 October 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu 
, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey, to Yemen 
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 216, 13 September 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Assassination Attempt 
Perpetrated in the Capital of Yemen, Sana’a 
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 184, 11 July 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Suicide Attack Perpetrated in Sana, the 
Capital of Yemen 
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 143, 22 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Meeting of the Friends of Yemen in Riyadh  
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 142, 21 May 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Suicide Attack Perpetrated in Yemen 
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 74, 06 March 2012, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Perpetrated by Al Qaeda in the city of 
Zinjibar in Yemen 
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2012 Yemen positive     
No: 63, 27 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated against 
the Presidential Palace in Yemen  
2012 Yemen positive     
No: 56, 24 February 2012, Press Release 
Regarding the Early Presidential Elections in 
Yemen 
2013 Algeria neutral     
No: 12, 21 January 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated at 
the Gas Site in the In Amenas/Tiguentourine 
Region Located in Southeastern Algeria 
2013 Bahrain positive     
No: 25, 31 January 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Call by the Government of Bahrain 
for the Revitalization of the National Dialogue 
Process in Bahrain 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 310, 23 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Relations Between Turkey and 
Egypt 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 269, 7 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Clashes in Egypt 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 228, 17 August 2013, Press Release on the 
Demonstrators Besieged at Al Fath Mosque in 
Egypt 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 211, 27 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
Last Night's Intervention To Peaceful Civil 
Protesters in Egypt 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 195, 8 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Deaths Occurred in Egypt After Shooting at 
Demonstrators. 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 192, 4 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Developments in Egypt 
2013 Egypt negative     
No: 22, 27 January 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Incidents Taking Place in Egypt 
2013 Egypt neutral     
No: 291, 4 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Trial of the Ousted President of 
Egypt, Mr. Mohammed Mursi  
2013 Egypt neutral     
No: 241, 6 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack against the Minister of 
Interior of the Interim Government of Egypt 
2013 Egypt neutral     
No: 226, 15 August 2013, Press release on 
Turkey's recall of its Ambassador to Egypt for 
consultations 
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2013 Egypt neutral     
No: 190, 3 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
The Latest Developments in Egypt. 
2013 Egypt positive     
No: 342, 24 December 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in Egypt 
2013 Iran neutral     
No: 312, 25 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey to Tehran to Participate in the 21st 
Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and 
for Bilateral Contacts with Iranian Officials 
2013 Iran neutral     
No: 289, 31 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Iranian Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Javad Zarif 
2013 Iran neutral     
No: 217, 3 August 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to 
Iran 
2013 Iran neutral     
No: 200, 11 July, 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit to Turkey of the Iranian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
2013 Iran positive     
No: 311, 24 November 2013, Press Release 
concerning the agreement on Iran’s nuclear 
program reached in Geneva  
2013 Iran positive     
No: 172, 16 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Presidential Elections in Iran 
2013 Iran positive     
No: 110, 16 April 2013, Press Release regarding 
the earthquake in Iran and Pakistan.  
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 334, 17 December 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Iraq yesterday (16 December) 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 323, 5 December 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Political Consultations at the Level 
of Undersecretaries of Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs between Turkey and Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 320, 1 December 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack Against the Motorcade of 
the President of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Arshad 
al-Salihi 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 298, 15 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
the Iraqi Cities of Karbala, Hafriyah and Kirkuk 
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2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 285, 28 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 259, 30 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in the Iraqi 
Cities of Irbil and Mussayab. 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 235, 28 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in 
Various Neighborhoods of Baghdad, the Capital 
City of Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 227, 16 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in 
Different Neighborhoods of Baghdad, Capital of 
Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 220, 11 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Blasts that took Place in Several 
Provinces of Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 214, 29 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 201, 13 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in the Iraqi 
Province of Kirkuk, on July 12, 2013  
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 183, 25 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 109, 15 April 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2013 Iraq neutral     
No: 15, 23 January 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in the 
Tuzkhurmatu District of Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 294, 9 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 283, 24 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Hoshyar Zebari to Turkey 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 185, 28 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Decision to Remove Iraq from its Obligations 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 167, 11 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in 
several cities of Iraq on 10 June 2013 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 144, 21 May 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq 
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2013 Iraq positive     
No: 141, 19 may 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 73, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
The Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated İn Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 71, 14 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 43, 18 February 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attacks in Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 33, 8 February 2013, Press Release on the 
Terrorist Bomb Attacks in Iraq  
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 9, 17 January 2013, Press Release Regarding 
Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in the Cities of 
Kirkuk and Tuzkhurmatu of Iraq 
2013 Iraq positive     
No: 8, 15 January 2013, Press Release Regarding 
Suicide Attack Perpetrated Near the City of 
Fallujah of Iraq 
2013 Israel negative     
No: 313, 26 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Decision to Establish New 
Settlements 
2013 Israel negative     
No: 290, 1 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Furthering of Israel’s Illegal 
Settlement Plans 
2013 Israel negative     
No: 240, 6 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Actions toward the Holy Al 
Haram al-Sharif and Freedom of Worship of 
Muslims 
2013 Israel negative     
No: 116, 22 April 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Reports Claiming That Talks Will be 
Conducted between Israel and Turkey about the 
Use of Akıncı Air Base 
2013 Israel negative     
No: 62, 8 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Entering of Israeli Forces to the Courtyard of 
Al-Haram Ash-Sharif 
2013 Israel negative     
No: 41, 17 February 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Decision by Israel for New 
Settlements 
2013 Jordan neutral     
No: 136, 10 May 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, to 
Jordan 
2013 Jordan positive     
No: 18, 25 January 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Elections in Jordan 
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2013 Kuwait neutral     
No: 35, 11 February 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit to Turkey by H.H. Sheikh 
Sabah Khalid Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Kuwait 
2013 Lebanon neutral     
No: 225, 15 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in 
Lebanon 
2013 Lebanon neutral     
No: 218, 9 August 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Turkish Airlines Pilots Abducted in Lebanon 
2013 Lebanon neutral     
No: 181, 24 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Fighting in the Lebanese City of Sidon. 
2013 Lebanon neutral     
No: 151, 25 May 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Conflicts in the City of Tripoli, in Lebanon 
2013 Lebanon neutral     
No: 84, 23 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Resignation of Prime Minister Mikati of 
Lebanon 
2013 Lebanon neutral Syria negative 
No: 75, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Air Strike Carried Out by Syria on Lebanon 
2013 Lebanon positive     
No: 232, 23 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Explosions in Tripoli, Lebanon 
2013 Libya neutral     
No: 266, 7 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack against a Military 
Checkpoint in Libya 
2013 Libya neutral     
No: 165, 10 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Clashes which took place in the city of 
Benghazi in Libya on 8 June 2013 
2013 Libya neutral     
No: 36, 12 February 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Participation of H.E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu at the Conference on Support for 
Libya, which will be held in Paris. 
2013 Libya positive     
No: 315, 27 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attack Against the Murad 
Agha Shrine in Libya 
2013 Libya positive     
No: 275, 11 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Kidnapping of Libyan Prime 
Minister Ali Zeidan 
2013 Libya positive     
No: 140, 15 May 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the bombing in the Libyan city of Benghazi  
2013 Libya positive     
No: 60, 8 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Perpetrated Against President of the 
General National Congress and Head of State of 
Libya 
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2013 Oman neutral Kuwait positive 
No: 281, 22 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu 
to the Sultanate of Oman and Kuwait 
2013 Palestine positive Israel neutral 
No: 222, 12 August 2013, Press Release 
concerning the initiation of talks between 
Palestine and Israel to prepare the ground for 
direct negotiations in the Middle East Peace 
Process 
2013 Palestine positive     
No: 166, 11 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
Minister Davutoğlu’s Visit to Azerbaijan to 
Participate in OIC Meetings on Palestine 
2013 Palestine positive     
No: 164, 8 June 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Inauguration of the new Palestinian 
Government 
2013 Qatar neutral Bahrain neutral 
No: 309, 22 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H. E. Mr. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Turkey, to Qatar and Bahrain 
2013 Qatar neutral     
No: 233, 24 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Dr. Khalid bin Mohamed 
Al-Attiyah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, 
to Turkey 
2013 Saudi Arabia neutral     
No: 234, 27 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey, to Saudi Arabia 
2013 Syria negative     
No: 231, 21 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated by the Forces 
of the Regime in Various Neighborhoods of 
Damascus in Syria 
2013 Syria negative     
No: 230, 21 August 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Allegations on the Use of 
Chemical Weapons by the Regime in Syria 
2013 Syria negative     
No: 187, 1 July 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Developments in Syria 
2013 Syria negative     
No: 126, 5 May 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Developments in Syria 
2013 Syria negative     
No: 113, 19 April 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Meeting at the level of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs on Syria 
2013 Syria negative     
No: 74, 19 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Establishment of the Interim Government by 
the Syrian National Coalition 
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2013 Syria neutral     
No: 280, 21 October 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Ministerial Meeting On Syria 
2013 Syria neutral     
No: 245, 14 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Agreement Reached Between the 
United States and the Russian Federation 
Concerning the Chemical Weapons Possesed by 
the Syrian Regime 
2013 Syria neutral     
No: 237, 3 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Ministerial Meeting of Syria 
Bordering Countries to be organized by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) on 4 September 2013 
2013 Syria neutral     
No: 158, 29 May 2013, Press Release regarding 
the visits paid by delegations of the main 
opposition party CHP to Syria.  
2013 Syria neutral     
No: 145, 21 May 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Meeting at the level of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs on Syria in Amman 
2013 Syria neutral     
No: 64, 10 March 2013, Press Release regarding 
an allegation about the stance of Turkey towards 
Syrians under protection in Turkey. 
2013 Tunisia positive     
No: 68, 13 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
the Formation of the New Government under 
the leadership of H.E. Mr. Ali Larayedh in Tunisia 
2013 Tunisia positive     
No: 32, 6 February 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia  
2013 Yemen neutral     
No: 248, 22 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
the Shabwah Governorate of Yemen 
2013 Yemen positive     
No: 347, 30 December 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Agreement signed for the 
Resolution of the Southern Question in Yemen 
2013 Yemen positive     
No: 324, 6 December 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against the 
Yemeni Ministry of Defense  
2013 Yemen positive     
No: 319, 30 November 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Assasination of Abdul-Karim 
Jadban, the Houthi representative at the 
National Dialogue Conference in Yemen 
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2013 Yemen positive     
No: 236, 1 September 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Assassination Attempt against 
Yemeni Prime Minister Mohammed Salem 
Basindwa 
2013 Yemen positive     
No: 76, 20 March 2013, Press Release Regarding 
Yemen National Dialogue Conference 
2013 Yemen positive     
No: 34, 9 February 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the Setting of the Date for the 
Launching of the National Dialogue Process in 
Yemen 
2013 Yemen positive     
No: 21, 26 January 2013, Press Release 
Regarding the News in Yemen Media  
2014 Algeria neutral     
No: 253, 25 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Passenger Plane Belonging to Algeria Airlines 
that Crashed in Mali 
2014 Bahrain positive     
No: 372, 03 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Elections in Bahrain 
2014 Bahrain positive     
No: 74, 5 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Bomb Attacks in Bahrain 
2014 Egypt negative     
No: 370, 02 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Statement of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Egypt on 2 December 2014 
2014 Egypt negative     
No: 307, 30 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Declaration Made by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Egypt on 29 September 
2014 
2014 Egypt negative     
No: 130, 28 April 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Verdicts of the Minya Criminal Court in Egypt 
2014 Egypt neutral     
No: 87, 17 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Perpetrated in Egypt on March 15 
2014 Egypt positive     
No: 343, 06 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attacks Perpetrated in 5-6 
November 2014 in Egypt 
2014 Egypt positive     
No: 220, 1 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Explosions in Egypt 
2014 Egypt positive     
No: 52, 18 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack against a Tourist Bus in 
Egypt 
2014 Egypt positive     
No: 26, 24 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Egypt 
2014 Iran neutral     
No: 373, 03 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Bomb Attack Perpetrated on the 
Residence of the Iranian Ambassador in Sana’a 
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2014 Iran neutral     
No: 79, 9 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Political Consultations between Turkey and 
Iran 
2014 Iran neutral     
No: 21, 20 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Against the Trade 
Attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Sana 
2014 Iran neutral     
No: 1, 2 January 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran 
2014 Iran positive     
No: 81, 12 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Third Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran 
2014 Iran positive     
No: 11, 13 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Agreement on the 
Implementation of Iran's nuclear Programme  
2014 Iraq negative     
No: 265, 11 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Statements of Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 298, 18 September 2014, Press Regarding 
the Participation of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the United Nations Security Council 
Meeting on Iraq 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 295, 14 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Conference on Peace and Security 
in Iraq to be Held in Paris 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 208, 24 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Armed Attack Causing the Death of Iraqi 
Turkmen Front Executive Board Member Munir 
Kafili 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 194, 9 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Perpetrated in the Iraqi town of Tuz 
Khormato 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 192, 9 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Bomb Attacks in Iraq 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 44, 10 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 14, 16 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Iraq 
2014 Iraq neutral     
No: 4, 7 January 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Developments in Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 403, 24 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in 
Iraq 
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2014 Iraq positive     
No: 397, 18 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Feridun Sinirlioğlu, 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Turkey, to Baghdad within the 
scope of the Second Meeting of the Turkey-Iraq 
High Level Strategic Council (HLSC) 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 371, 02 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Agreement Reached Between the 
Iraqi Central Government and KRG 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 339, 04 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 326, 21 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 324, 19 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Appointments to vacant Ministries 
in Iraqi Government 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 290, 9 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Establihsment of the New 
Government in Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 268, 12 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Latest Political Developments in 
Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 134, 1 May 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Elections Held in Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 108, 9 April 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Attacks Perpetrated in Iraq 
2014 Iraq positive     
No: 38, 5 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks perpetrated in 
Iraq 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 404, 25 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Illegal Settlement Activities 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 359, 20 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding Israel's Illegal Settlement Activities 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 354, 13 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Aggressive Acts in Jerusalem 
and its Illegal settlement activities 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 342, 05 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Violation of the Israeli Police 
against the Al-Aqsa Mosque  
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2014 Israel negative     
No: 330, 28 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Illegal Settlement Activities of 
Israel 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 316, 09 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Prevention of Muslims from 
Entering the Al-Aqsa Mosque by the Israeli 
Forces 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 308, 02 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding Israel's Illegal Settlement Activities 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 283, 1 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the New Illegal Settlement Activities 
of Israel in the West Bank 
2014 Israel negative Palestine positive 
No: 273, 20 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Disruption of Cease-fire 
Negotiations between Israel and Palestine 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 261, 4 August 2014,Press Realese Regarding 
the Israeli Attack against UN School in Gaza 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 256, 30 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Attacks Perpetrated by Israel against Gaza  
2014 Israel negative     
No: 247, 21 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
Israel’s Attack against the Shecaiye district of 
Gaza 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 243, 18 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack Perpetrated by Israel against Gaza 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 235, 8 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Operation Initiated by Israel against Gaza 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 186, 6 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
Israel's Decision to Construct of New Settlement 
Units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
2014 Israel negative     
No: 39, 7 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding Israel's Decision to Construct New 
Houses in the Illegal Settlements in East 
Jerusalem 
2014 Israel neutral Palestine positive 
No: 222, 1 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the three Israeli Youths Found Dead and the 
Latest Developments in Palestine 
2014 Israel neutral     
No: 8, 11 January 2014, Press Release on Israel's 
Announcement of New Tenders for Illegal 
Settlements 
2014 Israel positive Palestine positive 
No: 278, 27 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Agreement Reached between 
Israel and Palestine on Declaring Unlimited 
Ceasefire in Gaza 
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2014 Kuwait neutral     
No: 292, 12 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Incident between an Attaché of 
the Kuwaiti Embassy and a Turkish Army Officer 
2014 Lebanon positive     
No: 50, 16 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Formation of the New 
Government in Lebanon 
2014 Libya neutral     
No: 407, 28 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Air Strikes on Misrata and the 
Escalating Clashes in Libya 
2014 Libya neutral     
No: 337, 03 November 2011, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Special Representative Mr. 
Emrullah İşler to Libya 
2014 Libya neutral     
No: 254, 25 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Repatriation of our Citizens in Libya 
2014 Libya neutral     
No: 153, 20 May 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Incidents Taking Place in Libya 
2014 Libya neutral     
No: 123, 18 April 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Diplomats Kidnapped in Libya 
2014 Libya neutral     
No: 75, 5 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Participation of H.E. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey, in the Ministerial Conference on 
International Support to Libya to be held in 
Rome 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 344, 07 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Latest Developments in Libya 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 325, 20 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Special Representative Mr. 
Emrullah İşler to Libya 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 276, 24 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Clashes and Air Strikes in Libya 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 264, 8 August 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Inauguration of Libyan House of 
Representatives 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 257, 30 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Developments in Libya 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 217, 28 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Elections to the House of Representatives 
held in Libya 
2014 Libya positive     
No: 170, 27 May 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Establishment of the New Libyan 
Government 
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2014 Libya positive     
No: 89, 18 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Bombing in the Libyan City of Benghazi  
2014 Oman neutral     
No: 132, 30 April 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of H.E. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, 
Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs of the 
Sultanate of Oman, to Turkey 
2014 Palestine neutral     
No: 227, 3 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Killing of a Palestinian Youth 
2014 Palestine positive     
No: 385, 10 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Demise of Palestinian Minister 
Ziad Ebu Ayn 
2014 Palestine positive     
No: 250, 25 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Assistance Provided by Turkey to Palestine 
2014 Palestine positive     
No: 183, 2 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Establishment of the National Unity 
Government in Palestine 
2014 Palestine positive     
No: 18, 18 January 2014, Regarding the UN 2014 
International Year of Solidarity with the 
Palestinian People 
2014 Qatar neutral     
No: 258, 2 August 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Working Visit of the Foreign Minister of 
Qatar to Turkey 
2014 Saudi Arabia positive     
No: 341, 05 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Turkey to Saudi Arabia 
2014 Syria negative     
No: 294, 14 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Syrian Regime’s Use of Chemical 
Weapons 
2014 Syria negative     
No: 239, 15 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Appointment of the UN Secretary-General’s 
New Special Envoy for Syria  
2014 Syria negative     
No: 213, 27 June 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Shipping of the Chemicals out of Syria 
2014 Syria negative     
No: 128, 24 April 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Syrian Regime's Decision to Organize 
Presidential Elections on 3 June 
2014 Syria negative     
No: 94, 23 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Engagement of a Syrian Warplane Violating 
Turkey’s Airspace 
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2014 Syria negative     
No: 61, 23 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the UNSC’s Resolution on the 
Humanitarian Situation in Syria 
2014 Syria negative     
No: 41, 10 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Attack Against an UN Aid Convoy 
in the Homs Region in Syria 
2014 Syria neutral Jordan neutral 
No: 137, 3 May 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the third “Ministerial Meeting of Syria 
Neighbouring Countries” to be held in Jordan 
2014 Syria neutral     
No: 19, 19 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Syrian National Coalition's 
Decision to Attend the Geneva II Conference 
2014 Syria neutral     
No: 13, 16 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the “Ministerial Meeting of Syria 
Neighbouring Countries” to be hosted by Foreign 
Minister H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu in Şanlıurfa 
Harran Kökenli Container Temporary Protection 
Centre on 17 January 2014 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 402, 22 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Presidential Elections in Tunisia 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 364, 26 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the First Round of Presidential 
Elections of Tunisia Held on 23 November 2014 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 345, 07 November 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Tunisia 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 332, 28 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 322, 17 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Tunisia 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 242, 18 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Attack in Tunisia 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 42, 10 February 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Minister Foreign Affairs' Visit to 
Tunisia 
2014 Tunisia positive     
No: 31, 28 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the New Tunisian Constitution 
2014 UAE negative     
No: 306, 27 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Statement by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates 
2014 Yemen neutral     
No: 309, 02 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen 
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2014 Yemen positive     
No: 408, 31 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in 
Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 396, 16 December 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 347, 08 November 2024, Press Release 
Regarding the Formation of new Government in 
Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 317, 10 October 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 303, 23 September 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Latest Developments in Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 280, 30 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the New Developments in Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 269, 13 August 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Increasing Acts of Violence in 
Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 238, 12 July 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Developments in Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 95, 25 March 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Yemen 
2014 Yemen positive     
No: 32, 28 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the Conclusion of the National 
Dialogue Conference in Yemen 
2015 Algeria positive     
No: 210, 21 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack in Aïn Defla, Algeria 
2015 Bahrain neutral     
No: 241, 31 August 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack in Bahrain 
2015 Egypt negative     
No: 176, 16 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Confirmation of the Death Sentence Issued 
for Egypt’s Elected President Mr. Morsi 
2015 Egypt negative     
No: 155, 16 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Death Sentence Issued Against Mr. 
Mohamed Morsi, Elected President of Egypt 
2015 Egypt negative     
No: 125, 22 April 2014, Press Release Regarding 
the Sentencing of Mr. Mohamed Morsi, Former 
President of Egypt, to Imprisonment 
2015 Egypt negative     
No: 108, 12 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
Mass Death Penalty and Life-Term Sentences 
Issues in Egypt 
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2015 Egypt negative     
No: 32, 26 January 2015, Press Release 
Concerning the Incidents in Egypt on the 
Anniversary of the Tahrir Revolution 
2015 Egypt neutral     
No: 295, 25 November 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terror Attack Perpetrated in Egypt 
2015 Egypt neutral     
No: 193, 1 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terror Attacks in Egypt 
2015 Egypt neutral     
No: 191, 29 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terror Attack Perpetrated in Egypt 
2015 Egypt neutral     
No: 103, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the 2 April 2015 Terror Attacks Perpetrated in 
Egypt 
2015 Egypt positive     
No: 39, 29 January 2014, Press Release 
Regarding the 29 January 2015 Terror Attacks 
Perpetrated in Egypt 
2015 Iran neutral     
No: 205, 14 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action between the P5 + 1 and Iran Related to 
Iran’s Nuclear Program 
2015 Iran positive     
No: 102, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Agreement on the Nuclear Program of Iran 
2015 Iraq negative     
No: 303, 8 December 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Training Activity by Turkey in 
Bashiqa, Iraq 
2015 Iraq negative     
No: 220, 31 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Statement of the Iraqi Government about 
Turkey’s Operations towards the PKK Targets 
2015 Iraq neutral     
No: 231, 13 August 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Iraq 
2015 Iraq neutral     
No: 208, 18 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack in Iraq 
2015 Iraq positive     
No: 203, 13 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Visit of H.E. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Foreign 
Minister of Iraq to Turkey 
2015 Iraq positive     
No: 169, 1 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack in Samarra, Iraq 
2015 Iraq positive     
No: 120, 17 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Bomb Attack Perpetrated in Erbil, Iraq 
2015 Iraq positive     
No: 42, 30 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Iraq 
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2015 Israel negative     
No: 289, 19 November 2015, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Approval for Construction of 
New Housing Units in East Jerusalem  
2015 Israel negative     
No: 286, 12 November 2015, Press Release 
Regarding Israel’s Advancement of the 
Procedures for Building New Settlement Units 
2015 Israel negative     
No: 252, 13 September 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Intrusion of the Israeli Police into 
Haram Al-Sharif 
2015 Israel negative     
No: 186, 26 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Denial of Entry and Deportation of Some 
Turkish Citizens from Israel 
2015 Israel negative     
No: 146, 7 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
Israel's Approval 
2015 Israel negative     
No: 135, 27 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
Israel’s Tender Announcement for Construction 
of New Illegal Settlement Units  
2015 Israel negative     
No: 40, 30 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Decision of Israel to construct 
New Illegal Settlement in the Occupied West 
Bank 
2015 Jordan neutral     
No: 48, 04 February 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Killing of Jordanian Pilot Moaz al-
Kasasbeh by the DEASH Terrorist Organization 
2015 Kuwait neutral     
No: 188, 26 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Kuwait 
2015 Kuwait neutral     
No: 19, 15 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
Kuwait 
2015 Lebanon positive     
No: 287, 12 November 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
Lebanon 
2015 Lebanon positive     
No: 11, 11 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon 
2015 Libya negative     
No: 148, 11 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Dry Cargo Ship Attacked Off Tobruk/Libya 
2015 Libya negative     
No: 89, 23 March 2015, Press Release regarding 
the Attacks Perpetrated in the west of Libya 
2015 Libya negative     
No: 77, 28 February 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Unfounded Allegations of 
Abdullah al-Thinni, Prime Minister of the Interim 
Government in Libya, on Turkey 
111 
 
2015 Libya negative     
No: 7, 07 January 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Threat Against Turkish Aircraft Using Libyan 
Airspace 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 306, 11 December 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Ministerial Meeting on Libya 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 304, 8 December 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Martin Kobler, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for 
Libya, to Turkey 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 281, 26 October 2015, Press Release 
Regarding Latest Developments in Libya 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 260, 20 September 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Latest Developments in Libya 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 204 13 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Progress Achieved in the Libyan Political 
Dialogue Process 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 123, 20 April 2015, Press Release regarding 
the killings carried out by DEASH in Libya 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 69, 20 February 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated in 
the Libyan City of Qubbah 
2015 Libya neutral     
No: 26, 23 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Violation of the Ceasefire in Libya 
2015 Libya positive     
No: 311, 18 December 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Signing of the Libyan Political 
Agreement 
2015 Libya positive     
No: 308, 16 December 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Signing Ceremony of the Libyan 
Political Agreement 
2015 Libya positive     
No: 60, 16 February 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Killing of Egyptian Citizens in Libya 
by DEASH 
2015 Palestine neutral     
No: 221, 31 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated Against a 
Palestinian Family in the West Bank 
2015 Palestine positive     
No: 273, 13 October 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Developments in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories 
2015 Palestine positive     
No: 249, 11 September 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Resolution of the UN General 
Assembly to Hoist the Flag of the State of 
Palestine at its Headquarters  
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2015 Qatar neutral     
No: 141, 7 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Preparatory Meeting of High-Level Strategic 
Committee of Turkish-Qatari Foreign Ministers 
2015 Qatar positive     
No: 20, 16 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to 
Qatar 
2015 Saudi Arabia neutral     
No: 274, 14 October 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of H.E. Adel bin Ahmed Al-
Jubeir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Turkey 
2015 Saudi Arabia neutral     
No: 226, 7 August 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated against a 
Mosque in Saudi Arabia 
2015 Saudi Arabia positive     
No: 277, 17 October 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated 
Against a Hoseyniyeh in Saudi Arabia  
2015 Saudi Arabia positive     
No: 167, 30 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Saudi 
Arabia 
2015 Saudi Arabia positive     
No: 162, 22 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Against a Mosque in Saudi 
Arabia 
2015 Saudi Arabia positive     
No: 9, 08 January 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Saudi Arabia 
2015 Syria neutral     
No: 312, 19 December 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the UN Security Council Resolution on 
Syria 
2015 Syria neutral     
No: 267, 01 October 2015, Joint Declaration on 
Recent Military Actions of the Russian 
Federation on Syria 
2015 Syria neutral     
No: 230, 11 August 2015, Press Release 
Regarding The Allegations on the Participation of 
Aerial Vehicles from Incirlik Air Base in an 
Operation Near the Town of Atma/Syria. 
2015 Tunisia neutral     
No: 187, 26 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia 
2015 Tunisia positive     
No: 293, 24 November 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in 
Tunisia 
2015 Tunisia positive     
No: 271, 10 October 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Award of Nobel Peace Prize to the 
Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet 
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2015 Tunisia positive     
No: 86, 19 March 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attack Perpetrated in Tunisia 
2015 Yemen negative     
No: 53, 07 February 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Political Developments in Yemen 
2015 Yemen negative     
No: 28, 24 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Situation in Yemen 
2015 Yemen neutral     
No: 101, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Evacuation of Turkish Citizens in Aden, 
Yemen 
2015 Yemen neutral     
No: 88, 21 March 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated Towards Two 
Mosques in Yemen 
2015 Yemen neutral     
No: 22, 19 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Disturbances in Yemen 
2015 Yemen neutral     
No: 21, 16 January 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. 
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Yemen  
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 263, 24 September 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Suicide Attack Perpetrated at a 
Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen 
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 243, 2 September 2015, Press Release 
Regarding the Terrorist Attack at a Mosque in 
Sanaa, Capital of Yemen 
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 202, 10 July 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Humanitarian Ceasefire Declared in Yemen 
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 175, 15 June 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Participation of H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to the 
Extraordinary Meeting of Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) Foreign Ministers on Yemen 
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 166, 27 May 2015, Press Release Regarding 
Turkey’s Humanitarian Aid to Yemen 
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 115, 15 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Developments in Yemen and the Resolution 
Adopted by the UN Security Council on Yemen 
on 14 April 
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 104, 5 April 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Evacuation of Turkish Citizens in Yemen  
2015 Yemen positive     
No: 94, 26 March 2015, Press Release Regarding 
the Latest Developments in Yemen 
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Lühikokkuvõte 
 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks on analüüsida majanduskasvu mõju arenevate regionaalsete 
juhtivvõimude välispoliitika aktiivsusele. Selle teostamiseks viidi uurimistöö käigus läbi 
üksikjuhtumil baseeruv uuring. Käsitletavaks üksikjuhtumiks valiti töö autori poolt Türgi näide 
Lähis-Ida regioonis. 
Töö teoreetiline raamistik lähtub Barry Buzan and Ole Wæveri regionaalsete 
julgeolekukomplekside kontseptsioonist. Selle kohaselt on tähtsaimaks rahvusvaheliste suhte 
analüüsime tasandiks regioonid, mis on moodustatud ühiseid ohte tajuvatest riikidest, millel on 
tihe omavaheline läbikäimine. Buzani ja Wæveri käsitluse järgi on Lähis-Ida multipolaarne 
regioon, kus ei paikne ühtegi globaalset juhtivriiki. Regionaalse tasandil toimuva anlüüsimiseks 
saab kasutada samu teooriad, mida kasutatakse globaalse tasandi rahvusvaheliste suhete 
uurimiseks. Käesolev magistritöö on võtnud aluseks neorealistliku käsitluse maailmast. 
Neorealismi üheks põhiliseks printsiibiks on riikide tahe maksimeerida enda võimu selleks, et 
parandada enda julgeolekut. Regionaalse analüüsi kontekstis tähendab see, et riigid üritavad 
saavutada ülemvõimu esmalt enda piirkonnas, sest just sealt tulenvad nende julgeolekule 
suurimad ohud.  
Magistritöö keskseks hüpoteesiks on, et arengumaades regionaalsete juhtivvõimude kiire 
majanduskasv võimaldab neil kasutada üha rohkem raha oma välispoliitilise võimekuse 
tõstmiseks. Suurenenud kogus materiaalseid ressursse koos tahtega julgeolekukaalutlustel oma 
regionaalset mõjuvõimu suurendada, tekitab olukorra, kus regionaalsed juhtivvõimud hakkavad 
viljelema varasemaga võrreldes aktiivsemat ja jõulisemat välispoliitikat. 
Hüpoteesi kinnitamiseks teostati analüüs Lähis-Ida regiooni ja Türgi kohta. Analüüsi käigus leiti, 
et aastate 2002 ja 2015 vahel on Lähis-Ida riikide jõudude tasakaal jäänud üldises plaanis 
varasemaga sarnaseks. Kuigi Türgi majandus on kiirelt kasvanud ja nad on suurendanud näiteks 
oma kulutusi sõjaväele, on sama moodi käitunud ka teised piirkonna riigid Seetõttu pole Türgi 
suutnud enda suhtelist eelist teiste riikide ees märkimisväärselt suurendada.  
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Türgi sõjalistel kulutustel ja majanduskasvu vahel eksisteerib otsene seos. Kuna selle riigi 
kaitsekulutused on püsinud aastate vältel umbes 2% juures riigieelarvest, on kaitsekulutuste kasv 
tulenev üldisest Türgi riigi suurenenud riigieelarvest. Türgi majanduskasv on põhjustanud ka 
kolme kordse ekspordi kasvu Lähis-Ida riikidesse võrreldes sajandivahetusega. See omakorda 
muudab regiooni riigid endisest enam Türgist sõltuvaks ning suurendab Türgi “pehmet” jõudu 
Lähis-Idas.  
Uurimistöö käigus analüüsiti Türgi välispoliitilist aktiivsust kasutades Türgi välisministeeriumi 
kodulehel avaldatud pressiteateid ajavahemikus 2007-2015. Analüüsi käigus leiti, et Türgi riigi 
esindajad on hakanud selle ajaperioodi vältel enam külastama teisi Lähis-Ida regiooni riike. 
Enim külastusi tehti Saudi Araabiasse, Iraani ja Iraaki – riikidesse, mis on koos Türgiga regiooni 
juhtivriigid. Lisaks suurenenud väliskülastuste arvule on muutunud sagedasemaks ka üleüldine 
Lähis-Ida riikide mainimine Türgi pressiteadetes. Enim mainitud riikideks osutusid Iraak, Iisrael, 
Süüria, Jeemen ja Liibüa.  
Pressiteadete põhjal tehtud analüüsi järgi võib väita, et Türgi suhted enamiku regiooni riikidega 
on võrdlemisi sõbralikud. Negatiivses toonis käsitleti kogu antud perioodi vältel Iisraeli, millele 
heideti korduvalt ette Palestiina kodanike õiguste rikkumist. Vaadeldava ajaperioodi lõpus 
halvenes Türgi suhtumine Süüriasse, Iraaki ja Egiptusesse. Türgi valitsus hakkas toetama Süüria 
valitsuse võimult eemaldamist, mõistis hukka Egiptuses toimunud kindral al-Sisi poolt läbi 
viidud riigipöörde ja kritiseeris Iraagi valitsuse tegevusetust Kurdi terroristidega võitlemisel. 
Seega muutus Türgi välispoliitika perioodi lõpul teiste riikide suhtes kriitilisemaks ja ennast 
kehtestavamaks. 
Türgi välispoliitiline aktiivsus oli analüüsi järgi otseselt seotud riigi majanduskasvuga. Aastatel, 
mis järgnesid kiiret majanduskasvu, teostasid Türgi riigiametnikud rohkem välisreise Lähis-Ida 
piirkonda ning suurem kogus pressiteateid mainis teisi regiooni riike. Seega leidis kinnitust 
uurimistöö hüpotees, et regionaalsete juhtivriikide majanduskasv on seotud nende välispoliitilise 
aktiivsusega. 
Türgi kohta teostatud uuring annab informatsiooni regionaalsete juhtivriikide käitumise kohta. 
Samas ei ole kõik maailma piirkonnad üksteisele sarnased ja uuringu tulemusi ei saa tingimata 
kõigile regionaalsetele juhtivriikidele laiendada. Tulevikus on väärt kaaluda järeluuringu 
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teostamist, mis käsitleks juhtivriikide välispoliitika seost nende majandus kasvuga ka teistsuguse 
ülesehituse ja võimujoontega regioonides. 
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